Late Disclosure of Insider Trades: Who Does It and Why?

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• 作者：Millicent Chang ; Yilin Lim
• 关键词：Insider trading ; Delayed trade disclosure ; Risk ; Wealth ; Governance
• 刊名：Journal of Business Ethics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：133
• 期：3
• 页码：519-531
• 全文大小：423 KB
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• 作者单位：Millicent Chang (1)
  Yilin Lim (1)
  
  1. UWA Business School, The University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA, 6009, Australia
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Ethics
  Economic Growth
  Management
  Quality of Life Research
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0697

文摘

We attempt to understand the personal incentives that motivate corporate insiders to engage in unethical behavior such as delayed trade disclosure. Delayed disclosure affects corporate transparency and other shareholders in the firm potentially suffer investment losses because they are unaware of insiders’ activities. Using archival data from the 300 largest Australian firms between 2007 and 2011, the results show that risk factors such as insider age and tenure and wealth effects in the form of insider shareholdings affect the likelihood of delayed reporting. Governance positions such as committee membership mitigate this behavior. Our study highlights the importance of considering individual insider’s wealth and risk factors. The self-monitoring role of governance positions is also indicative of the effectiveness of internal corporate governance in the prevention of illegal insider behavior.