Evolutionary debunking of morality: epistemological or metaphysical?

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• 作者：Ramon Das
• 关键词：Evolution ; Debunking ; Evolutionary debunking arguments ; Meta ; ethics ; Moral naturalism ; Moral realism
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：173
• 期：2
• 页码：417-435
• 全文大小：433 KB
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• 作者单位：Ramon Das (1)
  
  1. Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Philosophy of Mind
  Philosophy of Religion
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

It is widely supposed that evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) against morality constitute a type of epistemological objection to our moral beliefs. In particular, the debunking force of such arguments is not supposed to depend on the metaphysical claim that moral facts do not exist. In this paper I argue that this standard epistemological construal of EDAs is highly misleading, if not mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the most widely discussed EDAs (including those of Joyce, Kitcher, Ruse, and Street) all make key and controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of morality or the (im)possibility of moral truth that belie their apparently epistemological character. I show that the debunking force of these EDAs derives largely from metaphysical claims about morality and their (alleged) implications for the (im)possibility of moral reduction, rather than from epistemological worries associated with the existence of an (alleged) causal/non-moral explanation of our moral judgments. The paper briefly concludes with a dilemma that I believe confronts all EDAs such as those discussed in this paper: either such arguments are unsound, or else they prove too much, debunking our knowledge of science and the external world, as well as morality.