Explaining rising regionalism and failing multilateralism: consensus decision-making and expanding WTO membership

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• 作者：Euan MacMillan (1)
  
• 关键词：Trade negotiations ; WTO ; International institutions ; Multilateralism ; Regionalism
• 刊名：International Economics and Economic Policy
• 出版年：2014
• 出版时间：December 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：11
• 期：4
• 页码：599-617
• 全文大小：459 KB
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• 作者单位：Euan MacMillan (1)
  
  1. Department for International Development, UK Government, London, UK
  
• ISSN：1612-4812

文摘

The beleaguered progress of the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) presents something of a puzzle for economic theory: if multilateralism is an effective forum for liberalisation (as it has been in the past), then why have the current round of talks faltered amid the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)? This paper builds a ‘hub and spoke-version of the Maggi (Am Econ Rev 89(1):190-13, 1999) model of trade negotiations to shows that the combination of the WTO single-undertaking and consensus decision-making principles with an expanded and more diverse membership can render multilateralism less desirable for hub countries than bilateralism. It is argued that these principles give spoke countries de facto veto power meaning that their threat point during WTO negotiations is a reversion to PTA negotiations between all parties. Accordingly, spoke countries with relatively less to gain from the WTO can use their veto power to extract gains from those that would benefit substantially. If an expanding WTO membership has increased the number of such countries, then the benefits of multilateralism versus regionalism from the perspective of hub counties may have been diminished to such an extent that they are no longer willing to wait for the conclusion of the Doha round before engaging in PTA negotiations.