Culture and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Language and Religion in Switzerland

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• 作者：Christophe Volonté
• 关键词：Corporate governance ; Board of directors ; Ownership structure ; Culture ; Language ; Religion
• 刊名：Management International Review
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：February 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：55
• 期：1
• 页码：77-118
• 全文大小：323 KB
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• 刊物主题：Business/Management Science, general; Organization/Planning; Emerging Markets/Globalization; Business Strategy/Leadership; Production/Logistics/Supply Chain;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1861-8901

文摘

We investigate the effect of culture on corporate governance using the extraordinary opportunity that the corporate landscape of Switzerland provides. Within a single institutional framework (e.g., Swiss federal corporate law), we use language (German and French) and religion (Roman Catholicism and Protestantism) as proxies for culture. These groups share a distinct set of values particularly in their tolerance for hierarchical structures. We observe that firms in Swiss–French areas and firms in Roman Catholic cantons are more likely to have one-tier boards, whereas two-tier boards are more prevalent in Swiss–German areas and Protestant cantons. Furthermore, board composition is significantly driven by language. In contrast, ownership and equity structure are not significantly related to culture.