Preference reversals: Time and again

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• 作者：Carlos Alós-Ferrer ; Ðura-Georg Granić ; Johannes Kern…
• 关键词：Preference reversals ; Decision times ; Imprecise preferences ; Compatibility hypothesis
• 刊名：Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：52
• 期：1
• 页码：65-97
• 全文大小：738 KB
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• 作者单位：Carlos Alós-Ferrer (1)
  Ðura-Georg Granić (1) (2)
  Johannes Kern (1)
  Alexander K. Wagner (1) (3)
  
  1. Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany
  2. Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, Netherlands
  3. Vienna Center for Experimental Economics and Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090, Vienna, Austria
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Economic Theory
  Microeconomics
  Operation Research and Decision Theory
  Environmental Economics
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0476

文摘

This paper sheds new light on the preference reversal phenomenon by analyzing decision times in the choice task. In a first experiment, we replicated the standard reversal pattern and found that choices associated with reversals take significantly longer than non-reversals, and non-reversal choices take longer whenever long-shot lotteries are selected. These results can be explained by a combination of noisy lottery evaluations (imprecise preferences) and an overpricing phenomenon associated with the compatibility hypothesis. The first cause explains the existence of reversals, while the second explains the predominance of a particular type thereof. A second experiment showed that the overpricing phenomenon can be shut down, greatly reducing reversals, by using ranking-based, ordinally-framed evaluation tasks. This experiment also disentangled the two determinants of reversals, because imprecise evaluations still deliver testable predictions on decision times even in the absence of the overpricing phenomenon. Strikingly, when unframed ranking tasks were used, decision times in the choice phase were greatly reduced, even though this phase was identical across treatments. This observation is consistent with psychological insights on conflicting decision processes.