Gaming the Social System: A Game Theoretic Examination of Social Influence in Risk Behaviour

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• 作者：Bahareh Esfahbod (16)
  Kurt Kreuger (16)
  Nathaniel Osgood (16)
  
  16. Department of Computer Science ; University of Saskatchewan ; Saskatoon ; SK ; Canada
  
• 关键词：Social network ; Game theory ; Liability ; Transitivity of trust
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：9021
• 期：1
• 页码：296-301
• 全文大小：454 KB
• 参考文献：1. AnyLogic Software, version 7.0.1. http://www.anylogic.com
  2. Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Johnson, J.C.: Social networks and trust in cross-cultural economic experiments. In: Whom Can We Trust? : How Groups, Networks, and Institutions Make Trust Possible, pp. 65鈥?0. Russell Sage Foundation (2009)
  3. Hilbe, C, Nowak, M, Sigmund, K (2013) Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner鈥檚 Dilemma games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 110: pp. 6913-6918 CrossRef
  4. Hofstadter, DR (1983) Computer tournaments of the Prisoner鈥檚 Dilemma suggest how cooperation evolves. Sci. Am. 248: pp. 14-20 CrossRef
  
• 作者单位：Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling, and Prediction
• 丛书名：978-3-319-16267-6
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

In this research we study the effect of social network in risk behaviour. Using an agent-based model based on very simple game-theoretic assumptions, we build a toy model involving donation games over a population. We considered two different variations of a strategy (individually focused and social group focused) and observed drastic differences at the collective level between each. Stable trust patterns were not evolvable in our model with completely social agents. Individually-oriented agents were required. But when trust patterns were able to form among the group-focused agents, large cliques tended to form, contrary to the individually-oriented agents.