Optimal manipulation rules in a mixed oligopoly

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• 作者：Corrado Benassi (1) (2)
  Alessandra Chirco (3)
  Marcella Scrimitore (2) (3)
  
• 关键词：Mixed oligopoly ; Strategic manipulation ; Partial privatization ; D43 ; L13 ; L32
• 刊名：Journal of Economics
• 出版年：2014
• 出版时间：May 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：112
• 期：1
• 页码：61-84
• 全文大小：
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• 作者单位：Corrado Benassi (1) (2)
  Alessandra Chirco (3)
  Marcella Scrimitore (2) (3)
  
  1. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater Studiorum, Università di Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126, Bologna, Italy
  2. Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Rimini, Italy
  3. Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Economia, Università del Salento, Lecce, Italy
  
• ISSN：1617-7134

文摘

We study the optimal manipulation rules of a public firm’s objective function in a mixed oligopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We start with a baseline duopoly model and compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way they are affected by product substitutability. This allows us to show that partial privatization, strategic delegation and other specific government’s commitments on the objective function of the public management can be looked at as special cases of these optimal rules, and to evaluate the viability of these policies under the two modes of competition. In this framework, we also discuss the equivalence between manipulation of the objective function and Stackelberg leadership. Since optimal manipulation rules change as new dimensions are added, we also derive the optimal rules under oligopoly, quadratic costs, and competition of international firms. This fairly general unified framework allows to discuss the impact of these factors on the government’s implementation policies of the optimal manipulation rules.