Maximum-Revenue and Optimum-Welfare Tariffs in International Mixed Duopoly: Does the Order of Firms-Move Matter?

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• 作者：Leonard F. S. Wang (1) lfswang@nuk.edu.tw
  Jen-yao Lee (2)
  Chin-shu Huang (3)
• 关键词：mixed oligopoly – partial privatization – tariff ranking
• 刊名：Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
• 出版年：2012
• 出版时间：September 2012
• 年：2012
• 卷：12
• 期：3
• 页码：273-283
• 全文大小：223.9 KB
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• 作者单位：1. Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung, No. 700, Kaohsiung University Road, Nan-Tzu District 811, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Republic of China2. Department of International Business, National Kaohsiung University of Applied Science, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Republic of China3. Department of International Business, Yu Da University, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China
• ISSN：1573-7012

文摘

This paper examines the effect of privatization on the priority of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff in a mixed oligopoly with partial privatization and foreign competition. Major findings of this paper are that: firstly, in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization and asymmetric marginal costs, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm is higher than a critical value, the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff regardless of the order of firms’ move; secondly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and cost is symmetric, the optimum-welfare tariff will be higher than the maximum-revenue tariff; thirdly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and the domestic firm is highly ineffective in production, under Stackelberg public leadership, the optimum-welfare tariff is low and then it is more possible that the optimum-welfare tariff is lower than the maximum-revenue one.