Governance through government networks: The G8 and international organizations

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• 作者：Sieglinde Gst?hl (1)
  
• 关键词：G7 ; G8 ; Global governance ; Government network ; Debt relief ; Terrorist finance ; F02 ; F34 ; F37
• 刊名：The Review of International Organizations
• 出版年：2007
• 出版时间：March 2007
• 年：2007
• 卷：2
• 期：1
• 页码：1-37
• 全文大小：429KB
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• 作者单位：Sieglinde Gst?hl (1)
  
  1. Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe, 8000, Bruges, Belgium
  

文摘

As an informal grouping without headquarters, permanent staff or legal powers, the world’s major industrialized countries must rely on other actors, in particular international organizations, to manage global problems. This article examines how the Group of Eight contributes to global governance by cooperating with international organizations in the cases of debt relief and the fight against terrorist finance. It shows that the G8 draws on international institutions with the aid of government networks and argues that this cooperation is stronger, the greater the Group’s concentration of relevant power and the more important it considers the institutions-resources.