Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief

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• 作者：Antonia Peacocke
• 关键词：Self ; knowledge ; Belief ; Transparency ; Mental action ; Agency
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：174
• 期：2
• 页码：353-377
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883
• 卷排序：174

文摘

You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental action is both a judgment that p and a self-attribution of a belief that p. The notion of embedded mental action is introduced here to explain how this can be so and to provide a full epistemic explanation of the transparency method. That explanation makes sense of first-person authority and immediacy in transparent self-knowledge. In generalized form, it gives sufficient conditions on an attitude’s being known transparently.