Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences

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• 作者：Mathieu Doucet ; John Turri
• 关键词：Weakness of will ; Akrasia ; Self ; control ; Resolution ; Intention ; Commitment violation ; experimental philosophy ; Folk psychology
• 刊名：Synthese
• 出版年：2014
• 出版时间：November 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：191
• 期：16
• 页码：3935-3954
• 全文大小：355 KB
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• 作者单位：Mathieu Doucet (1)
  John Turri (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, 200 University Ave W, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada
  
• ISSN：1573-0964

文摘

Prior work on weakness of will has assumed that it is a thoroughly psychological phenomenon. At least, it has assumed that ordinary attributions of weakness of will are purely psychological attributions, keyed to the violation of practical commitments by the weak-willed agent. Debate has recently focused on which sort of practical commitment, intention or normative judgment, is more central to the ordinary concept of weakness of will. We report five experiments that significantly advance our understanding of weakness of will attributions by showing that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is less thoroughly psychological than the philosophical debate has assumed. We begin by showing that a sizable minority of people attribute weakness of will even in the absence of a violated commitment (Experiment 1). We then show that weakness of will attributions are sensitive to two important non-psychological factors. First, for actions stereotypically associated with weakness of will, the absence of certain commitments often triggers weakness of will attributions (Experiments 2-). Second, the quality of an action’s outcome affects the extent to which an agent is viewed as weak-willed: actions with bad consequences are more likely to be viewed as weak-willed (Experiment 5). Our most important finding is that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is sensitive to two non-psychological factors and is thus much broader than philosophers have thus far imagined. We conclude by suggesting a two-tier model that unites our findings with traditional philosophical theorizing about weakness of will.