Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test

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• 作者：John Turri
• 关键词：Knowledge ; Assertion ; Norms ; Social cognition ; Belief ; Evidence ; Experimental philosophy
• 刊名：Synthese
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：February 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：192
• 期：2
• 页码：385-392
• 全文大小：251 KB
• 参考文献：1. Benton, M. A. (2012). Knowledge norms: Assertion, belief, and action. Rutgers University, New Brunswick. PhD Thesis.
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• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Metaphysics
  Philosophy of Language
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0964

文摘

An impressive case has been built for the hypothesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion, otherwise known as the knowledge account of assertion. According to the knowledge account, you should assert something only if you know that it’s true. A wealth of observational data supports the knowledge account, and some recent empirical results lend further, indirect support. But the knowledge account has not yet been tested directly. This paper fills that gap by reporting the results of such a test. The knowledge account passes with flying colors.