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- 作者：John Turri ; Wesley Buckwalter ; Peter Blouw
- 关键词：Knowledge attribution ; Luck ; Social cognition
- 刊名：Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- 出版年：2015
- 出版时间：April 2015
- 年：2015
- 卷：22
- 期：2
- 页码：378-390
- 全文大小：364 KB
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文摘
Nearly all success is due to some mix of ability and luck. But some successes we attribute to the agent’s ability, whereas others we attribute to luck. To better understand the criteria distinguishing credit from luck, we conducted a series of four studies on knowledge attributions. Knowledge is an achievement that involves reaching the truth. But many factors affecting the truth are beyond our control, and reaching the truth is often partly due to luck. Which sorts of luck are compatible with knowledge? We found that knowledge attributions are highly sensitive to lucky events that change the explanation for why a belief is true. By contrast, knowledge attributions are surprisingly insensitive to lucky events that threaten, but ultimately fail to change the explanation for why a belief is true. These results shed light on our concept of knowledge, help explain apparent inconsistencies in prior work on knowledge attributions, and constitute progress toward a general understanding of the relation between success and luck.
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