Selfless assertions: some empirical evidence

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• 作者：John Turri
• 关键词：Assertion ; Knowledge ; Belief ; Norms ; Social cognition
• 刊名：Synthese
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：April 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：192
• 期：4
• 页码：1221-1233
• 全文大小：537 KB
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• 作者单位：John Turri (1)
  
  1. Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON, N2L3G1, Canada
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Metaphysics
  Philosophy of Language
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0964

文摘

It is increasingly recognized that knowledge is the norm of assertion. As this view has gained popularity, it has also garnered criticism. One widely discussed criticism involves thought experiments about “selfless assertion.-Selfless assertions are said to be intuitively compelling examples where agents should assert propositions that they don’t even believe and, hence, don’t know. This result is then taken to show that knowledge is not the norm of assertion. This paper reports four experiments demonstrating that “selfless assertors-are viewed as both believing and knowing the propositions they assert: this is the natural and intuitive way of interpreting the case. Thought experiments about selfless assertions do not threaten the knowledge account and they do not motivate weaker alternative accounts. The discussion also highlights a general lesson for philosophers: thought experiments intended to probe for mental state attributions should not conflict with basic principles that guide social cognition.