Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision

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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision

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作者：John Turri
关键词：Norms ; Belief ; Decision ; Truth ; Knowledge ; Evidence
刊名：Synthese
出版年：2015
出版时间：December 2015
年：2015
卷：192
期：12
页码：4009-4030
全文大小：872 KB
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作者单位：John Turri (1)

1. Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON, N2L3G1, Canada
刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
刊物主题：Philosophy
Philosophy
Logic
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
出版者：Springer Netherlands
ISSN：1573-0964

文摘

According to factive accounts of the norm of belief and decision-making, you should not believe or base decisions on a falsehood. Even when the evidence misleadingly suggests that a false proposition is true, you should not believe it or base decisions on it. Critics claim that factive accounts are counterintuitive and badly mischaracterize our ordinary practice of evaluating beliefs and decisions. This paper reports four experiments that rigorously test the critic’s accusations and the viability of factive accounts. The results undermine the accusations and provide the best evidence yet of factive norms of belief and decision-making. The results also help discriminate between two leading candidates for a factive norm: truth and knowledge. Knowledge is the superior candidate. Keywords Norms Belief Decision Truth Knowledge Evidence