Popper and Wittgenstein on the Metaphysics of Experience

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• 作者：Harry Smit
• 关键词：Basic statement ; Bipolarity ; Norms of representation ; Ostensive definition ; Synthetic a priori
• 刊名：Journal for General Philosophy of Science
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：October 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：46
• 期：2
• 页码：319-336
• 全文大小：418 KB
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  Wittgenstein, L. (1973 [1922]). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. London: Routledge, Kegan Paul Ltd. German text with an English translation by C. K. Ogden.
  Wittgenstein, L. (1975). Philosophical remarks, ed. R. Rhees, tr. R. Hargreaves and R. White, Oxford: Blackwell.
  Wittgenstein, L. (2009 [1953]). Philosophical investigations, Chichester: Wiley. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Revised fourth edition by P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte.
  
• 作者单位：Harry Smit (1)
  
  1. Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy of Science
  History
  Philosophy of Education
  Methodology of the Social Sciences
  Social Sciences
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8587

文摘

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein argued that there are metaphysical truths. But these are ineffable, for metaphysical sentences try to say what can only be shown. Accordingly, they are pseudo-propositions because they are ill-formed. In the Investigations he no longer thought that metaphysical propositions are pseudo-propositions, but argued that they are either nonsense or norms of descriptions. Popper criticized Wittgenstein’s ideas and argued that metaphysical truths are effable. Yet it is by now clear that he misunderstood Wittgenstein’s arguments (namely that metaphysical propositions are ill-formed because they employ unbound variables) and misguidedly thought that Wittgenstein used the principle of verification for distinguishing empirical propositions from metaphysical propositions. Because Popper developed his philosophy in part as a critique of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, this invites the question of whether these misunderstandings have consequences for his own philosophy. I discuss this question and argue that Popper’s attempt to distinguish metaphysics and science with the aid of a criterion of testability is from Wittgenstein’s perspective misguided. The main problem facing Popper’s philosophy is that alleged metaphysical propositions are not theoretical propositions but rules for descriptions (in the misleading guise of empirical propositions). If Wittgenstein’s ideas are correct, then metaphysical problems are not scientific but grammatical problems which can only be resolved through conceptual investigations. Keywords Basic statement Bipolarity Norms of representation Ostensive definition Synthetic a priori