摘要
涉农小额贷款对于农业经济发展具有不可或缺的重要作用,但是由于受环境影响较大、以信用贷款为主、贷款规模较小和贷款信息不对称等客观情况的存在,使得商业银行很难准确把控涉农贷款的风险性,为降低不良率提高的风险,惜贷现象常常发生,使得农业生产很难得到商业银行的资金支持,一定程度上制约了农业的发展,背离了国家服务农业经济发展的战略方针。从提高商业银行与农业生产者信息对称性的角度出发,结合现实中商业银行对不同风险等级项目容忍度不同的常规操作方式,通过博弈论的视角,研究了商业银行识别和管控涉农小额贷款风险的方法。
Agricultural-related microfinance plays an indispensable role in the development of agricultural economy. However, due to the impact of environmental factors, credit loans, loan scale and loan information asymmetry, it is difficult for commercial banks to accurately control the risk of agricultural loans. In order to reduce the risk of increasing the non-performing rate, the phenomenon of reluctance to lend often occurs, making it difficult for agricultural production to obtain financial support from commercial banks. To a certain extent, it restricts the development of agriculture and deviates from the national strategic policy of serving agricultural economic development. From the perspective of improving the symmetry of information between commercial banks and agricultural producers, combined with the conventional operation methods of commercial banks with different tolerances for different risk level projects. From the perspective of game theory, this paper studies the methods for commercial banks to identify and control the risk of agricultural micro-finance.
引文
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