摘要
以企业投资不足为研究视角,探讨董事长与CEO任期交错的公司治理效用,并比较了不同情境下该效用的强弱。研究发现,董事长与CEO任期交错可以显著地抑制企业投资不足问题,经过稳健性检验和内生性讨论后,结论依然成立。进一步分析发现,当企业大股东持股比例较高时,董事长与CEO任期交错对企业投资不足的抑制作用不显著,只有当大股东持股比例较低时,二者任期交错才会抑制企业投资不足。由此证明,董事长与CEO任期交错具有积极的公司治理效用,但该作用的发挥具有情景效应。
From the angle of under investment, this paper discusses corporate governance effects of staggered terms of chairman and CEO, and compares the strengths of this utility in different situations. The study finds that staggered terms of chairman and CEO can significantly inhibit the shortage of investment. This conclusion remains valid after robustness test and endogenous discussion. Further analysis finds that when the big shareholders hold a high proportion of shares, staggered terms of chairman and CEO can not restrain under investment significantly, and only when the proportion of large shareholders is lower, this effect is significant. This proves that staggered terms of chairman and CEO has positive corporate governance effects, but not in all cases.
引文
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(1)董事长与CEO任期交错属于高管任期异质性的一种,由于本文只关注董事长与CEO两者之间任职年限的差异,因此采用董事长与CEO任期交错这一说法更合理。
