摘要
近年来,股权质押借款成为上市公司控股股东外部融资的重要手段,由此导致的控制权转移风险影响了控股股东对上市公司高风险创新活动的态度。我国货币政策的频繁调整也引发了不确定性预期,从而影响企业外部融资环境。在货币政策存在不确定性的背景下,探讨控股股东股权质押对企业创新的影响具有重要的意义。文章系统探讨了控股股东股权质押与企业创新之间的关系,以及货币政策不确定性对这一关系的调节作用。研究发现,控股股东股权质押会显著抑制企业创新,且这种抑制作用具有持续性,而货币政策不确定性加剧了股权质押对上市公司创新活动的抑制作用。进一步研究发现,与策略性创新相比,控股股东股权质押对上市公司实质性创新的抑制作用更强。文章拓展了股权质押对企业投融资决策影响的文献,丰富了宏观经济政策与微观企业行为的相关研究。文章的研究还有助于提醒控股股东积极披露股权质押相关信息,减少对上市公司的利益侵占;同时,政策制定者应提高政策调整的透明度,减弱企业对政策的不确定预期,从而促进宏观经济政策指引下实体经济的长期稳定发展。
In recent years,stock pledge financing becomes an important kind of financing means of listed companies' controlling shareholders. However,pledge financing can also increase the risk of losing control rights faced by controlling shareholders,as well as bring cash flow to them at the same time. Thus the controlling shareholders of listed companies may change their operational decisions to reduce this risk. The enterprise is the main body of economic growth,while innovation is the important source of the enterprise to improve productivity. Unlike capital investment,innovation investment faces a higher risk,which needs a longterm stable source of funding but comes a lower short-term return. Therefore,under the background of stock pledge,how do the controlling shareholders of listed companies treat the high-risk innovation investment? Since the financial crisis,the frequent adjustment of monetary policies in our country leads to an uncertainty expectation,which exacerbates the instability of the stock market and worsens the financing environment of the enterprise. With the increase of monetary policy uncertainty,how does controlling shareholders' stock pledge affect innovation? It is worth finding answers to such a question,which has a strong practical significance on creating a good innovation environment and maintaining the stability of the capital market. Leveraging a sample of A-share listed companies from 2005-2015,this paper investigates the relationship between controlling shareholders' behavior and enterprise innovation,and the adjustment effect of monetary policy uncertainty. The results show that controlling shareholders' stock pledge leads to a decrease in enterprise innovation,and this inhibiting effect will be sustained for a long time. Monetary policy uncertainty strengthens the negative relationship between stock pledge and enterprise innovation. Furthermore,compared with the strategic innovation,we find that controlling shareholders' stock pledge has a stronger inhibitive effect on substantial innovation. Considering the mechanism of stock pledge on innovation,we find that risk-taking and financial constraints are two transmission channels between stock pledge and innovation. We advance the literature in several ways. First,we broaden the literature of controlling shareholders' behavior on the economic consequence of enterprise investment and financing decisions. In addition,we enrich the mechanism of stock pledge on enterprise innovation. Based on the myopia theory and the agency theory,our research finds that there are two transmission channels between stock pledge and enterprise innovation:(1)After pledging the stock,controlling shareholders may force listed companies to avoid risky project for decreasing the volatility of stock price. Then the risk profile of listed companies decreases,resulting in a lower innovation level.(2)After pledging the stock,the agency conflict becomes stronger,which increases the financial constraints faced by listed companies,resulting in a lower innovation level. Second,we distinguish the different types of innovation to examine the different effects of stock pledge,which extends the literature of enterprise innovation. Third,we further examine the effect of the dynamic adjustment of monetary policies on the negative relationship between stock pledge and enterprise innovation,which contributes to the macroeconomic policy and enterprise behavior research.
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(1)例如,2011年12月7日,重庆啤酒宣布公司投入巨资参与研制十三年的乙肝疫苗,经临床实验评估为无显著疗效,公司股价应声暴跌。又如,2015年以来,以科技创新著称的暴风科技股价经历了一路飙升至数次一字跌停。
(1)由于ShiborSD本身具有年度效应,模型(2)中没有控制年份效应。
(1)为节省篇幅,表中未列示控制变量回归结果,下同。
(1)为节省篇幅,文中未列示内生性检验和稳健性检验结果,感兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
