摘要
高管减持过程中是否会利用其内部人优势来谋取私利,一直备受市场关注。本文以2006—2014年间国内A股公司高管减持交易为对象,基于纸质媒体和互联网媒体样本,系统研究了公司媒体披露管理行为及其市场效应。研究发现,高管减持期间公司媒体关注度和报道倾向异常上升,即存在主动管理媒体披露的现象;而且,在减持不同时期,其主动管理策略也不一样。此外,减持规模和参与减持高管人数对管理媒体披露的动机有显著影响,但参与减持高管职位的高低对其没有明显影响。策略性媒体披露在短期内可助推股价上升,有利于高管通过高位减持来实现财富转移,长期看则会导致股价反转。进一步研究发现,同行高管会利用媒体披露管理行为的外部性,进行"搭便车"减持。本研究拓展并丰富了公司媒体(信息)披露管理方面的研究,对信息披露监管和投资者决策等方面具有启示性意义。
Increasing numbers of managers in China are converting their stocks into cash. The statistics show the market value of stock that executives sold are about 96 billion and 113 billion RMB in 2016 and 2015,increased respectively by1. 34 times and 1. 86 times compared to 2014. Obviously,the size and growth speed of executives holdings-selling are very amazing. As senior managers are the actual controllers of companies,the large-scale selling of stock is usually viewed as a bad sign for a company,and its stock price is likely to fall sharply. Furthermore,managers are also able to take advantage of their insider status to boost the stock price during stock selling periods,which is harmful for individual investors' interests and is not conducive to develop healthily for Chinese stock market.Using samples of managers' stock selling from 2006 to 2014 in China's A-share market and news coverage from newspapers and the internet,we research the strategic behavior of deliberate media disclosure and its market effects. To identify management behavior regarding media disclosure strategies,we adopt the following three methods. First,we use statistical descriptive analysis to determine whether media attention and coverage tone change significantly in different stages of stock selling periods. Second,we use a dummy variable to demonstrate the effect of managers' stock selling on media coverage( including media attention and coverage tone). Finally,we identify whether managers actively manage media coverage during stock selling periods by testing whether the stock price reverses after they finish their stock selling.We find that managers actively manage media coverage during their stock selling periods. First,a firm's level of media attention will rise in the early stage of stock selling,will peak during stock selling,and will drop significantly or recover to a normal level afterward. Second,the media disclosure focus varies in different periods: managers focus on obtaining media attention in the early stage but on obtaining a more favorable tone when they begin to sell. Third,the number of stocks being sold and the number of participants have significant effects on a disclosure strategy,but managers' positions have insignificant effects. Fourth,managers can acquire more wealth by managing their disclosure strategies to boost the stock price in the short term and cause the stock price to reverse in the long term. Finally,the external effects of managing media disclosure will induce other peer managers to sell their shares. In short,media disclosure has become a vehicle for seeking self-interest. Our findings have important implications for regulation of information disclosure,insider trading and investor decision.The contributions of our study are as follows.( 1) Compare to existing literature about information disclosure management while major shareholders selling their holdings( Wu & Wu,2010),we focus on information disclosure management by senior managers during their stock selling periods,specifically their active media disclosure management behavior in periods of stock selling from the perspective of trading-driven information. This research contributes to the research of insider trading and information superiority.( 2) Prior literatures on media disclosure management during important events that involved in overall interests for company,such as merger and acquisition( Ahern & Sosyura,2014),scandals( Zavyalova et al.,2012; Gu,2016) and equity financing( Cai et al.,2014; Wang et al.,2015; Wang & Li,2016). Few research study this strategic behavior in the situation that concerning managers' private interests directly. We explore senior managers' use of media disclosure strategies to seek their self-interests when they sell their holdings,and further enrich the literature about media disclosure management of company.( 3) We find that the externality effect of media disclosure management induces other peer managers to free-ride and sell their stock. This finding may be explains the causation of "peer effects"in corporate decisions( Leary & Roberts,2014).
引文
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(1)为表述方便,下文“媒体披露策略”、“选择性或策略性媒体披露”、“主动管理或操控媒体披露”等与之同义。
(1)如2016年11月17日,天龙集团发布高送转公告;接着,关于该公司高送转概念的媒体报道快速攀升(半个月内,百度新闻搜索约838条),公司股价连续两天涨停。此后不到一个月,公司总经理冯毅及家属冯军、前任总经理程宇、董事冯华等高管在限售股解禁后累计减持2400余万股(套现近8个亿),约占公司总股本8.3%;本轮集中减持后,公司媒体报道急剧下降,股价也明显下跌。而且此前,10月10日公司发布了重大资产重组的消息,随后公司媒体报道由先前每月约20条上升到80条,公司股价也明显上升(上涨约15%);尽管重组方案在11月8日宣布终止,股价有所回调,但仍没有回调到重组公告前水平。显然,该公司高管减持期间,明显涉嫌选择性披露来配合其减持。而且,此类现象在国内股票市场中较为普遍。
(1)因篇幅原因,留存备索。
