摘要
在考虑了市场主体对于政府担保预期的情况下,本文选取欧元区17个国家的116家银行2004-2014年的数据作为样本,通过对危机前、危机中以及危机后三个时期存款保险限额与银行风险承担间关系的考察,验证了二者间U型关系的存在,指出存款保险限额的提高并不一定会提高银行风险承担水平,存在最优的保险限额能够最小化银行的风险承担;同时,我们发现政府在危机时期的担保行为,可能强化市场主体对于政府担保的预期,进而使得危机过后,即使政府取消担保,最优的存款保险限额也不再存在。进一步地,我们认为在我国存款保险的初创时期,选择较高的存款保险限额,降低市场主体对于政府担保的预期,将更有利于明晰政府的职能定位,缓解长期政府隐性担保下积累的银行体系的道德风险问题。
With the expectation of government guarantee considered, this paper, taking financial data of 116 banks in 17 Euro Countries from 2004 to 2014 as samples, examines the relationship between banks' risk-taking and deposit insurance coverage respectively in the pre-crisis period, crisis period and post-crisis period. The results verify the U-shaped relationship between banks' risk-taking and deposit insurance coverage. This indicates that the increase of deposit insurance coverage will not necessarily improve the level of bank's risk exposure; there is an optimal deposit insurance coverage which can minimize banks' risk-taking. Meanwhile, the results also indicate that the temporary government's guarantee in the crisis period will make the optimal deposit insurance coverage no longer exist even through the guarantee is cancelled by enhancing the expectation of market entities to the government's guarantee. Furthermore, we purpose that a high deposit insurance coverage which can weaken the expectation of market entities to the government's guarantee will be more beneficial to clear governmental function orientation and alleviate the moral hazard problem in the start-up period of China's deposit insurance system.
引文
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