股权激励、过度自信与公司业绩——基于盈余管理“噪音”的视角
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  • 英文篇名:Equity Incentive, Overconfidence and Corporate Performance: Based on the “Noise” Perspective of Earnings Management
  • 作者:刘柏 ; 卢家锐
  • 英文作者:LIU Bai;LU Jia-rui;Business School, Jilin University;
  • 关键词:股权激励 ; 过度自信 ; 公司业绩 ; 盈余管理
  • 英文关键词:Equity Incentive;;Overconfidence;;Company Performance;;Earnings Management
  • 中文刊名:YNCM
  • 英文刊名:Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
  • 机构:吉林大学商学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-08-05
  • 出版单位:云南财经大学学报
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.35;No.208
  • 基金:国家社会科学基金项目“金融市场开放环境下的金融风险生成逻辑、风险测度和防范机制研究”(18BJY232)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:YNCM201908010
  • 页数:14
  • CN:08
  • ISSN:53-1209/F
  • 分类号:90-103
摘要
文章以2010―2016年数据为样本,通过剔除公司业绩中盈余管理"噪音",考察股权激励对公司真实业绩发挥的作用。研究结果显示,股权激励对公司真实业绩具有正向作用,但激励效果低于未剔除盈余管理"噪音"前的预期;其次,管理者过度自信会弱化股权激励对公司真实业绩的效果;最后,区分产权性质发现,管理者过度自信弱化股权激励对公司真实业绩的效果主要体现在非国有企业中,在国有企业中没有明显影响。文章丰富了股权激励方面的理论研究,也在实践方面为提高公司股权激励效果提供了相关政策建议。
        This paper takes data from 2010 to 2016 as samples, and examines the effect of equity incentives on the real performance of company by eliminating the "noise" of earnings management from company performance. The research results show that equity incentives have a positive effect on the real performance of companies, but the incentive effect is far lower than the expectation before the "noise" is eliminated. Secondly, overconfidence of managers will weaken the effect of equity incentives on the real performance of companies; finally, by taking property rights into the analysis, the paper finds out that the weakening effect of equity incentives on the real performance of companies can be found mainly in non-state-owned enterprises, and the influence is not obvious in state-owned enterprises. This research not only enriches the theoretical researches on equity incentives, but also provides relevant policy recommendations for improving the equity incentive effect of companies in practice.
引文
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