摘要
减少代理成本、促进股东财富增长是股权激励的主要目的之一,但它也可能因为管理层机会主义而变得无效。因此,考察股权激励样本在考核基期的真实盈余管理情况及其在股权激励草案公告日前后的股东财富效应颇有意义。研究发现:激励样本在股权激励考核基期存在负向的真实盈余管理,激励草案的公告能够显著增加股东财富,股东财富增加的幅度与公司业绩和行权考核条件高低正相关,但是剔除盈余管理的影响后,公司业绩与股东财富增长不相关。研究表明:股权激励草案的公告虽然增加了股东财富,但在考核基期也存在盈余管理,这种盈余管理削弱了公司业绩与股东财富增长之间的正相关关系。
Reducing agency costs and promoting shareholder wealth is one of the main purposes of equity incentive,but it may also be ineffective because of management opportunism. Therefore,it is of significance to investigate the real earnings management of equity incentive samples in the base period and the shareholder wealth effect before and after the announcement date of equity incentive draft. The study finds that there is a negative real earnings management in the incentive sample in the base period,and the announcement of the equity incentive drafts significantly increases the shareholder wealth of the samples. The increase of shareholders' wealth is positively correlated with the performance of the company and the assessment conditions of exercising rights. However,after eliminating the influence of earnings management,the performance of the company is not related to the growth of shareholder wealth. The research shows that the announcement of equity incentive draft increases the shareholder wealth,but the earnings management also exists in the base period of equity incentive, which weakens the positive correlation between company performance and shareholder wealth growth.
引文
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