摘要
国际法的碎片化是一种中性的体系结构,是国际法体系以及其内部子体系发展中的客观样态。其中,国际投资法体系正呈现出典型的碎片化结构,它是国际投资法扩张发展的客观结果,根源在于其混合的性质。不仅如此,碎片化虽然给国际投资法体系带来了结构性困难,但对促进此体系的发展以及更宏观的国际经济秩序协调具有独特优势。
Fragmentation represents an objective structure,which appears naturally in the system of international law and its sub-system during the process of development. Wherein,the system of international investment law is most typically fragmented. This structure results from the expansion of international investment law,and is deeply rooted in its hybrid characters. Furthermore,notwithstanding the difficulties arising from fragmentation,such a structure can contribute to the development of international investment law,and more broadly the coordination of international economic order in unique ways.
引文
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1 Stephen M.Schwebel法官曾于1999年在联合国大会发言,认为新出现的国际裁判机构可能彼此冲突,虽然这一担忧还未成真。随后,在2000年与2001年,Gilbert Guillaume连续两年对此问题进行系统且直接的论述,尽管其担忧更多在于国际法院可能丧失对国际法体系的整体控制功能。(参见:Martti Koskenniemi,Pivi Leino.Fragmentation of International Law?Postmodern Anxieties[J].Leiden Journal of International Law,2002,(15):553-555.)
1 有学者认为国际裁判机构的扩散会产生负面影响。(参见:Thomas Buergenthal.Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals:Is It Good or Bad?[J].Leiden Journal of International Law,2001,(14):267-272.)有学者认为当这些裁判机构就同一个国际法规则作出不同解释时,国际法体系的正当性将岌岌可危。(参见:Jonathan I.Charney.Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?[J]Recuil des Cours:Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law,1998,(271):105-125.)
2 例如:Martti Koskenniemi,Pivi Leino.Fragmentation of International Law?Postmodern Anxieties[J].Leiden Journal of International Law,2002,(15):553-579;William W.Burke-White.International Legal Pluralism[J].Michigan Journal of International Law,2004,(25):963-980.
3 有关国际法委员会对此问题的具体研究主题与研究过程介绍,参见:International Law Commission.Fragmentation of International Law:Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law[R].Gevena:ILC,2006:400.
4 有关“体系”与“子体系”的提法,主要来源于对外文文献中措辞“system”、“sub-system”的翻译。最先促使国际法委员会对此问题进行研究的Gerhard Hafner教授就采用此措辞。(参见:Gerhard Hafner.Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law[J].Michigan Journal of International Law,2004,(25):849-864.)
5 有关“无组织状态”(unorganized system)的论述,参见:Karl Zemanek.The Legal Foundations of the International System:General Course on Public International Law[J].Recuil des Cours:Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law,1997,(266):62.
6 国际法委员会在关于碎片化的报告中指出:“如果碎片化是一个‘自然’进程……似乎总是具有同样自然的相反趋势,(将国际法)引向另一个发展路径。”
1 这一标准不仅反映了发展中国家的主权要求,并同时构成了拉美国家早期吸引外国投资的政策承诺。对于“卡尔沃主义”的详细论述,参见:Santiago Montt.State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation[M].Oxford:Hart Publishing,2009:31-82.
2 该标准在1926年“尼尔案”中更进一步得到诠释。有关最低标准待遇的论述,参见:Andreas Hans Roth.The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens[M].Leiden:AW Sijthoff,1949.
3 第二次世界大战后,德国失去大量海外投资。当时德国缔结BIT的主要动机即在于使其国内私人财产利益免受政治因素的影响。值得注意的是,其主要条约起草人Hermann Josef Abs是一个银行家,带有很强的商业意识。(参见:Rudolf Dozler,Christoph Schreuer.Principles of International Investment Law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008:18.)
4 有关国际投资法体系的混合型性质,参见:Zachary Douglas.The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration[J].British Yearbook of International Law,2004,(74):173.
1 此处借用Pauwelyn教授对国际规则冲突的分类。他认为,在共处法时期,国际法主要由大量分散的双边条约组成。国际规则冲突主要发生于同一主权国家(A)对不同国家(B、C)分别作出相冲突的承诺、承担相矛盾的义务时,称为AB/AC类冲突。到合作法时代,多边体制增多,国际规则冲突则主要体现为主权国家(A、B)同时参与相互冲突的多边体制,各自引用不同体制内的规则对同一问题作不同主张的情形,称为AB/AB类冲突。(参见:Joost Pauwelyn.Conflict of Norms in Public International Law[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008:18.)
2 针对阿根廷的汇率政策,来自不同国家的投资者分别依据不同投资条约对阿根廷提起仲裁,多达20几件,如Abaclat and Others v.Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/07/5;AES Corporation v.The Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/02/17,Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A.and others v.Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/08/9;Teinver S.A.,Transportes de Cercanías S.A.and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A.v.The Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/09/1;AWG Group Ltd.v.The Argentine Republic,UNCITRAL,Azurix Corp.v.The Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/01/12;BP America Production Company,Pan American Sur SRL,Pan American Fueguina,SRL and Pan American Continental SRL v.The Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/04/8;Metalpar S.A.and Buen Aire S.A.v.The Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/03/5;CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Republic of Argentina,ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8等。
3 尤其是各国BIT对“投资”(investment)进行限定时,通常承认“间接投资”(indirect investment)。因此,即使投资者通过设立在第三国的公司、实体在东道国间接持有投资,也受投资条约保护。相应的BIT条款如:2004年加拿大BIT范本(Article 1 Definitions:Investment of an investor of a Party means an investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an investor of such Party.)或传统的定义方式如德国2008年BIT范本(Article 1 Definitions:...the term“investments”comprises every kind of asset which is directly or indirectly invested by investors of one Contracting State in the territory of the other Contracting State.)或1991《美国-捷克BIT》(Article I(1)(a):...investment means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party,such as equity.)。
4 参见:CME Czech Republic B.V.v.The Czech Republic,UNCITRAL(2003);Ronald S.Lauder v.The Czech Republic,UNCITRAL(2001).
5 母国通常仅在条约条款含义需要解释、明确时,与东道国一起作出意见,典型的如NAFTA的FTC(Free Trade Commission)对公平公正待遇(FET)条款的内涵进行解释。
1 随着国际投资市场的发展,传统东道国面临更多来自海外的投资,而传统母国也逐渐以“东道国”身份参与国际投资仲裁。例如,美国在NAFTA实践过程中发现其也陷入投资者提起的仲裁之中,因此,几乎每一个国家都具有东道国身份。
2 投资条约天然地具备双重功能:划分主权空间、保障投资者利益。因此,传统的AB条约可以被一分为二,成为Ab、Ba条约。此时,当我们分析投资条约时,就应当以每一个“东道国”为切入点,将投资条约划分为以“东道国”为核心的条约群。事实上,当各国逐渐同时具有东道国(A、B、C)与母国(分别代表投资者a、b、c的利益)双重身份时,这种条约功能的双重性将更为明显。
3 参见:Decision on Annulment,MTD Equity Sdn Bhd.&MTD Chile S.A.v.The Republic of Chile,ICSID Case No.ARB/01/7,Mar.21,2007,para.75.
4 投资条约有时会规定,基于东道国违反投资条约损害投资者利益的投资争端可以被仲裁,但并不列举仲裁过程中可以适用的规则,也不排除其他种类的争端可以被管辖。如2012年《中日韩投资保护协定》15条第1款、挪威2007年BIT草案第15条第1款、德国2008年BIT范本第10条(但该条款没有将投资争端限定为违背此条约而引起的争端)。
5 例如,美国2012年BIT范本(Article 30:Governing Law)、加拿大2004年BIT范本(Article 40:Governing Law,但该条没有列举国内法)。
6 参见:ICSID Convention,Article 42(1).
7 参见:Decision on Annulment,Klckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v.United Republic of Cameroon and SociétéCamerounaise des Engrais,ICSID Case No.ARB/81/2,May 3,1985,2 ICSID Rep.90(1990),para.69.
1 参见:Asian Agricultural Products Limited v.Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,ICSID Case No.ARB/87/3,June 27,1990,ICSID Rev.-FILJ 5(1990),p.533.
2 有关国际法体系中特殊法与一般法的关系,参见:Bruno Simma,Dirk Pulkowski.Of Planets and the Universe:Self-contained Regimes in International Law[J].European Journal of International Law,2006,(17):486.
3 关于正当性危机有许多论述,参见:Ari Afilalo.Meaning,Ambiguity and Legitimacy:Judicial(Re-)Construction of NAFTA Chapter 11[J].Northwestern Journal of International Law&Business,2005,(25):279-315;CN Brower,SW Schill.Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boom to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law[J].Chicago Journal of International Law,2008,(9):471-498.
4 Frank教授在其文章中指出:“这种成长的结果是,对将产生经济、政治后果的公共事务的裁决由不同主体私下作出。这些主体能够也实际上就同一法律问题作出相互冲突的裁决,并且没有一个实体有能力去解决这些不一致……正当性很大程度上取决于诸如确定性、一致性等因素,而这些因素进一步与预见性、可靠性相关。相应的概念比如公正、平等、责任性、代表性、正当程序以及核查机会等也会影响正当性。”
1 关于投资法公法性质的论述,参见:Benedict Kingsbury,Nico Krisch,Richard B.Stewart.The Emergence of Global Administrative Law[J].Law and Contemporary Problems,2005:15-61;Gus Van Harten,Martin Loughlin.Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law[J].European Journal of International Law,2006,(17):121-150;Stephan W.Schill.International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2010.
2 参见:Gus Van Harten.Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law[J].OUP Catalogue,2007:45-71;Stephan W.Schill.International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2010:14-17.
3 参见:Loewen Group,Inc.and Raymond L.Loewen v.United States of America,ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/98/3.
4 参见:Metalclad Corporation v.The United Mexican States,ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/97/1;Chemtura Corporation v.Government of Canada,UNCITRAL.
5 参见:CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Republic of Argentina,ICSIDCase No.ARB/01/8;Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3;Gas Natural SDG,S.A.v.The Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/03/10;LG&E Energy Corp.,LG&E Capital Corp.,and LG&E International,Inc.v.Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1.
6 Paulsson就此提出了“arbitration without privity”,以说明投资仲裁对国家的管辖特征。(参见:Jan Paulsson.Arbitration without Privity[J].ICSID Review,1995,(10):232-257.)
7 例如,《ICSID条约》第25条第1款对投资争端的定义:“the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment”,但在解释时,很难确定“dispute arising directly out of an investment”的具体含义与范围。(参见:Rudolf Dolzer,Christoph Schreuer.Principles of International Investment Law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2012:230-233.)
8 关于投资条约扩散的原因,主要有“囚徒困境”(prisoner’s dilemma)和“网络效应”(network effects)两种理论。Guzman教授最早指出BIT扩散的“囚徒困境”,即发展中国家全体认同国家经济主权的重要性,且明了签订投资条约会为其主权带来损害,却私下纷纷通过缔结BIT以吸引投资,以提高本国制度在投资市场的竞争力。(参见:Andrew T.Guzman.Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties[J].Virginia Journal of International Law,1998,(38):639-688.)Santiago Montt则反对Guzman教授的观点,认为投资条约扩散不是因为各国基于“囚徒博弈”不得不作出较坏的选择,而是在于投资条约本身的功能将通过越来越多的国家的使用而增强,从而形成“网络效应”。(参见:Santiago Montt.State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation[M].Oxford:Hart Publishing,2009:83-123.)
1 参见:Gus Van Harten.Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007;Naveen Gurudevan.An Evaluation of Current Legitimacy-Based Objections to NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Investment Dispute Resolution Process[J].San Diego International Law Journal,2005,(6):399-402.
2 在1945年以前,这些合同通常将大片的油田等特许给投资者,主要规定权利转让问题,不为投资者附加相应义务。在20世纪六七十年代,随着“经济主权”等概念的兴起,产油国纷纷要求对本国资源进行控制。相应地,投资合同发展为“利益分享协议”(profit-sharing agreements),主权国家仍然保持对资源的所有权,与投资者分享开采的收益,并且对投资者的技术转让等问题作要求。到20世纪90年代,投资不仅局限于资源开发,基础建设等领域的投资也异常活跃。由此,投资合同发展出“建设、运营、所有”(build,operate,own,BOO)与“建设、运营、转让”(build,operate,transfer,BOT)等模式。(参见:Dolzer R,Schreuer C.Principles of International Investment Law[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2012:72-73.)
3 有关绝对标准与相对标准的发展过程,可参考Montt对卡尔沃主义的论述。(参见:Santiago Montt.State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation[M].Oxford:Hart Publishing,2009:31-82.)
4 Klausner教授以格式条款为例,发展出“网络效应”理论,认为规则可以通过不断适用而增加价值。(参见:Michae Klausner.Corporations,Corporate Law,and Network of Contracts[J].Virginia Law Review,1995,(81):757.)
1然而,应当避免发生的是碎片化在国际法体系中制造自给自足的孤岛,与国际法体系内其他分支不相关联。(参见:Joost Pauwelyn.Bridging Fragmentation and Unity:International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands[J].Michigan Journal of International Law,2003,(25):904.)
