摘要
俄罗斯2000年后的自由化、市场化进程倒退带来了快速持久的经济增长,这与其在20世纪90年代施行自由化市场化改革却导致经济大幅衰退形成鲜明对比。与俄国不同,同为转型国家的中国自70年代末开始的市场化改革带来了持久快速的经济增长,而与此同时的转型过程也导致社会经济系统的多个领域出现协作效率下降,社会问题加剧等问题。针对上述现象,传统理论难以提供有效解释。本文致力于研究在社会经济系统中,有限理性主体所持主体知识的构成与作用,以及不同主体之间的知识共享问题,借此解释上述现象。具体地,本文探讨了在社会经济系统中为支撑决策,有限理性主体知识的具体构成与特点,探讨并发现处于不同环境的有限理性主体,其知识结构存在差异的本质原因。在此基础上,本文研究有限主体间知识共享于调整特征,并依据上述理论研究对转型国家的转型绩效差异进行解释。
本文的主要研究内容和创新点如下：
首先,本文探讨了社会经济系统中有限理性主体的决策这一被广泛重视的问题。在面临有限理性资源约束并需要处理纷繁复杂问题的社会经济系统中,有限理性主体可以采取依赖决策规则库的规则支配决策或者采取依赖消耗理性资源的理性计算决策以获取问题处理方案。有限理性主体所持有的知识对其决策制定及实践结果具有至关重要的作用。
本文的这一研究在一定程度上解决了理论界目前争论不休的话题——在纷繁复杂的社会经济系统中,主体的决策究竟是理性的还是非理性的?本文研究表明,社会经济系统中的有限理性主体可以采取看似非理性的规则支配决策,而获取与理性计算决策十分接近的决策效果。主体知识在促进有限理性主体简化决策过程,获取有效决策结果的过程中发挥了无法替代的作用。
其次,在以支撑决策为最终目标的指引下,本文研究了处于不同社会经济系统的有限理性主体,其主体知识出现显著差异的本质原因。研究发现,为实现有效决策,有限理性主体需要在主体知识与决策环境之间建立最优联系,主体知识存在与决策环境相匹配的最优结构。在社会经济系统中,有限理性主体所持知识出现差异的本质原因在于其所处具体决策环境的不同(社会环境和自然环境)。社会经济系统中的有限理性主体分散于社会的各个角落,他们日常需要处理的事件各不相同,差异的环境特征要求有限理性主体建立不同的主体知识以实现最佳匹配。
本文的这一工作较大地推进了现有关于有限理性主体知识结构的研究,之前的理论研究认为主体知识应当具有结构化、菜单化特征,但未探究主体知识的具体结构化特点,本文的研究较好的解决了上述问题,并证明了有限理性主体知识应当与决策环境保持的最优匹配关系。
第三,本文探讨了当决策环境发生改变时,主体知识的调整变化过程及其特点。在社会经济系统中,经济环境社会环境始终始终处于不断变化的动态过程中。这种变化既包括诸如社会经济转型这样的大范围、高强度改变,也包括日常工作生活中的技术进步、社会交往方式变革等小范围、低强度改变。本文研究表明,由于多种因素的影响,主体知识的调整存在粘性,主体知识不会随其所临决策环境特征的改变而进行及时有效的调整。在主体知识成功建立之后,主体知识调整的粘性会导致主体无法及时调整其知识以匹配新环境。由于主体知识调整的困难,当社会经济系统发生改变时,分散于社会不同角落的持有不同知识的有限理性主体,难以随着所临环境的微小变化及时有效地调整其主体知识。
第四,本文研究了有限理性主体间的知识共享问题。本文首先考察了影响主体间知识共享的关键参数,这包括社会交往指数、交流成功可能性、知识摈弃率等。本文具体探讨了上述参数对有限理性主体间知识共享过程、速度及结果的影响。在此基础上,本文进一步引入知识的具体复杂特征,知识在有限理性主体间的共享过程必须借助特定的渠道和媒介,本文分析在此过程中相关因素的影响,发现知识共享的误差漂移现象。本文重点强调了知识摒弃率对有限理性主体间知识共享的影响,知识摒弃率的大小取决于社会因素和自然因素,不同国家的历史背景、社会公众意愿对知识共享的影响主体通过这一参数而在模型中加以体现。
本文这一研究正式化了现有转型理论研究中的部分假设,这些理论认为转型国家的历史背景、公众意愿极大地影响了转型过程和绩效,却始终缺乏正式理论模型加以证明。本文的工作解决了这一问题。
第五,基于主体知识对有限理性主体决策的重要作用以及主体间知识共享的若干特征,本文解释了不同转型国家转型绩效差异的本质原因。中央计划经济与市场经济体制作为两种不同的资源配置社会系统,本质上要求不同结构的主体知识与之匹配。决定转型国家转型绩效的重要因素在于,社会主体原有的科层依赖决策知识能否及时有效地调整为水平分散体系决策知识,以适应决策环境由中央计划经济向市场经济转型带来的重大环境变化。转型社会中有限理性主体所持主体知识调整的速度与有效性性决定了转型国家的转型绩效。通过采用不同国家的转型绩效数据,采用理论研究揭示的多个因素检验了本文理论研究的有效性,检验结果支持本文的研究结论。本文的这一研究弥补了现有转型理论的解释力不足的弊端。
The rapid and sustained economic growth accompanied by the back of liberalization and market-oriented reforms in Russia after 2000 contrasts greatly with it's great economic recession in the 1990s which was accompanied by the liberalization and market-oriented reforms. In contrast with Russia, China, another transitional country, is now attaining its rapid and sustained economic growth since its market-oriented reforms in late 1970s. The traditional theory could not provide a valid interpretation to such complex phenomenon. In this dissertation, I dedicate to analyze the composition and effect of the knowledge held by agents who is constrained by bounded rationality, and the problems in the process to share knowledge between agents in a social economic system. The dissertation analyzes the features of the composition of knowledge held by bounded rational agents, seeks the causes of the differences between knowledge, discusses of the characteristics of knowledge sharing and adjustment. I explain the different transition performance with the theory.
Specifically, the paper's main research content and innovation points include the followings.
Firstly, the dissertation analyzes an important issue which has been greatly analyzed, how do agents make their decisions in social economic system? Under the constraints of bounded rationality and the necessity of dealing with problems under numerous and complex social economic system environment, the agent can rely on the rule-oriented decision-making which rely on the knowledge or the calculate-oriented decision-making which rely on the consumption of bounded rationality to get the program of dealing with problems. The knowledge held by the bounded rational agents has a crucial role in the decision making process of the rule-oriented decision-making pattern. It helps rule-oriented decision-making to get a result which is quiet the same as the calculate-oriented decision-making.
The analysis is able to solve the problem which is argued a lot between the theorists to a certain extent, whether the decision-making of agent is rational or irrational in reality. The research shows that, in the social economic system, the decision-making of agent who is under the constraints of bounded rationality is seemed to be irrational by the pattern of rule-oriented decision-making, but such a decision-making can get a result which is close enough to that of the calculate-oriented decision-making. The knowledge held by agents plays irreplaceable role in such a decision-making process.
Secondly, under the guidance of the ultimate goal of backing up decision-making, the dissertation analyzes the features of the knowledge which is thought to be essential and tries to find out the causes of the differences of knowledge between different agents. The research shows that there exits an optimal structure between the knowledge held by bounded rational agents and the decision-making circumstances. In a social economic system, the cause of the difference between knowledge held by agents is due to the different circumstances that the agents live in.
The analysis is able to advance the existing knowledge analysis of agents under the constraints of bounded rationality greatly. There have been some opinions of the structural feature of knowledge in the existing theories, but they never find out the specific structural features of knowledge which was settled in this dissertation. The analysis found out the cause of different knowledge held by agents in the same society.
Thirdly, the dissertation analyzes the process and features of adjustments and changes of knowledge under the changes of decision-making circumstances. Change is one of the main features of the circumstances in the social system and the change of the decision-making circumstances is the nature of the transitional countries calling transitional. The research shows that, the adjustment of knowledge is viscous for a lot of reasons; the knowledge held by agents will not change timely and effectively according to the change of decision-making circumstances. The viscous feature will make the agent unable to adjust their knowledge to adapt to new environments.
Such an analysis can enhance the importance and explanatory power of the research before. Because of the difficulties in the adjustment of knowledge, the bounded rational agent who are widely scattered in different parts of the community, may not be able to adjust their knowledge to adapt to new environments.
Fourthly, in a social economic system which is under changing, the overall efficiency not only relies on the decision-making effectiveness of single agents, but also depends on the collaborations between agents of bounded rationality, which will rely on the set up of common knowledge between agents. The research finds out several important parameters which influence the knowledge sharing process between agents.Finally we find out that due to the particularity of knowledge, knowledge can not be spread directly between agents and must rely on coding system.
The study formalized some key assumptions of modern transitional economic theory, which consider the parameter of history and the public will affect the transitional performance greatly.
Lastly, base on the position that knowledge plays in decision-making of bounded rational agents and the several features of the knowledge sharing between agents in social economic system; the dissertation explains the nature cause of the difference between different transitional countries. As different kinds of resource allocation and decision-making social economic systems, central planned economy and market economy system need different knowledge to match with. The main important factor in the performance of transformation in transitional countries is whether the hierarchy-relied decision-making knowledge can adjust to market-relied decision-making knowledge timely and effectively. The speed and effectiveness of such an adjustment determine the performance of transformation in transitional countries. The data and the test results support the conclusions of this research. The study of this article is able to make up the existing shortage of the explaining power of the existing transition theory.
引文
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