摘要
利益相关者共同治理理论对于我国项目治理机制的健全发展具有重要的指导意义。本文以电网建设项目为研究对象,探讨电网建设项目基于多元利益相关者共同治理机制的构建。
由于电网企业的自然垄断属性和公用型属性,长期以来,传统项目管理多是关注项目可行性或简单依靠施工技术的项目管理方式来赢得市场,而对电网建设项目反映的经济问题关注不够,这种竞争模式己经不适应市场经济发展的需要,项目管理面临一系列新的矛盾及问题。主要表现在向电网建设项目投入了各种专用性资产的多元利益相关者要求参与项目治理;多元利益相关者之间存在利益冲突;不确定条件下项目利益相关者的协调激励和约束等。同时,我国电网建设项目治理改革的深化及其成效的实现归根结底是关于电网建设项目治理模式的选择及其治理机制构建问题。所以,探寻这些问题的本质以及如何解决这些矛盾就成为本文的主要尝试和研究意义所在。
本文首先通过对国内、外项目治理机制研究发展等作了广泛的文献回顾,对不同的理论观点进行了整理和述评,梳理出电网项目治理中存在的问题、形成原因及影响因素,基于委托代理理论、利益相关者理论等介绍本文研究的主要内容、基本方法及创新点。
接着,通过对项目产权契约理论的批判性回顾和逻辑性推导,认为项目是一组不完全产权契约的临时性多边组织。随着社会经济文化环境和投入项目的专用性资产稀缺性的不断变化,项目所有权边际不断的调整,项目契约主体实现了向治理主体的转变。通过对电网建设项目治理模式的比较分析,揭示了项目治理机制的本质是多元利益相关者共同治理。
本文从项目是“所有相关利益主体之间的一系列临时契约”的观点出发,认为这一组契约的主体包括建设单位、设计单位、施工单位、政府、基层组织及居民等多元利益相关参与主体。然后,将多元化的利益相关者抽象为理性经济人,发现他们的利益要求之间存在差异和冲突。既然有利益冲突,那就需要设计一种机制来协调、消除这些冲突,以合作代替冲突。论文认为电网建设项目作为一种财富创造和分配的有效机制,更多依赖的是多元利益主体之间的合作行为。项目治理机制的创新就是不断的对项目产权进行边际调整,平衡多元利益相关者的利益要求,从而实现项目目标。
在市场竞争环境高度不确定性的条件下,如何通过建立项目多元利益相关者合作机制解决利益冲突?首先,在对电网建设项目内部利益相关者相互双方博弈机理进行分析的基础上,建立了项目内部利益相关者三方之间的行为博弈模型,通过博弈混合策略纳什均衡求解,对三方之间的博弈关系进行了分析,解释了不确定环境下的多元利益相关者的合作博弈模型的可操作性。
针对电网建设项目存在的信息不对称,根据委托代理理论,从委托人(电网公司)与代理人(承包商或监理单位)之间存在的利益冲突入手,建立了针对道德风险的防范模型,同时在借鉴委托代理理论的激励约束机制基本分析框架基础上,建立了信息不对称条件下的最优激励与监控约束模型,并探讨分析了激励机制与监控约束机制在电网建设项目委托代理关系中的作用。
针对电网建设项目外部利益相关者利益分享问题,论文探讨了在完全信息条件下电网公司、基层组织、当地居民三方合作博弈补偿机理,在此基础上根据电网建设项目利益相关者的个体行为特征,从不同利益相关主体博弈过程中的谈判成本和努力程度两方面着手,构建了基于外部利益相关者的冲突协调补偿机制模型,并借助Swarm工具方法对该补偿机制进行仿真比较分析,验证了冲突协调补偿机制的可操作性及有效性。旨在为管理者设计有效补偿机制维护各方利益,减少外部冲突,构建和谐的电网建设外部环境,加快电网建设步伐提供科学依据和决策支持。
最后,论文通过对我国电网建设项目治理发展历程及现状分析,探索建立基于多元利益相关者共同治理的项目治理新模式,并提出了加强制度建设、建立激励与约束机制、加强电网建设市场信用建设、完善市场配套机制等几个方面的完善我国电网建设项目治理机制的建议。
Stakeholders in co-governance theory to improve the development of our corporate governance mechanism have important guiding significance. In this paper, power grid construction project governance mechanism as a study object to explore the power grid construction project which is based on multi-stakeholder co-management Mechanism.
As the natural monopoly business property and the public good properties of the power , a long time, traditional project management are mostly concerned about the feasibility study or simply rely on the construction project management techniques to win the market, while pay insufficient attention to the economic problems reflected by grid construction projects.This competition model hasn’t adopted to the needs of market economic development, and project management faces a series of new contradictions and problems. Mainly to the multi-stakeholder who put a variety of specialized assets into the power grid projects demanded to participate in project governance; multi-stakeholder conflict of interest; uncertainty under the coordination of the project stakeholders and other incentives and constraints. Meanwhile, the deepening of management and reform of China's power grid enterprise project and realization of its effectiveness , in the final analysis, is a issue of Governance Selection and Mechanism construction on power grid construction project.Therefore, to explore the nature of these problems and how to resolve these conflicts become the main attempt of this article and research significance.
Firstly, domestic and international project management through the development of management studies were extensively literature reviewed ,and sort out the governance of the project's history, key elements, trends, identifying existing shortcomings of previous studies. Based on principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory, explained the main contents, the basic approach and innovation of this paper.
Then, through the critical review of ownership of the project contract theory and logical deduction, the project is regarded as a temporary multilateral organizations of property rights contract which is not entire. On this basis, that defines the content of the governance mechanism for grid construction projects, and illustrate theoretically the main content of grid construction project governance mechanism.
This project starts from the view of "from all stakeholders between a series of temporary contracts", thinking that this is a group of subject construction unit, including the design, construction, government, community and residents in such diverse interests related. Then, the diversification benefits related subject abstract for rational agent, found their interests and conflicts having the request differences. Since there had a conflict of interest, then we should design a mechanism for coordinating and eliminating these conflicts, conflicting with cooperation. The paper believes grid construction projects as a kind of wealth creation and distribution of the effective mechanism, relying more on the main interest is the cooperation between behavior interests. Project management is the constant innovation of mechanism of marginal adjustment, property projects multiply interests balance of interests related to subject, so as to realize the goal of the project.
Under conditions of high uncertainty of the competitive market environment, what we can do to resolve conflicts of the project through the establishment of the main multi-stakeholder co-operation mechanism? Firstly, based on the analysis the game mechanism within stakeholders with each other of in the power grid construction projects, then established the three main game models within the project stakeholder, Secondly, explores their game relationship through the game mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution, Thirdly ,it explains the operability of the multi-stakeholder model of cooperative games under the uncertain environment .
According to the asymmetric information of Power grid construction projects and the principal-agent theory, from the principal (grid companies) and agent’(contractor or supervision unit) conflicts of interest between each other, a model for the Prevention of Moral Hazard was established The dissertation sets up the model of preventing moral hazard which was based on the principal-agent theory. It builds the optimization incentive and monitoring model under the circumstance of asymmetric information to prevent moral hazard and explores the effects of incentive and monitoring mechanisms in the principal-agent relationship of Power grid construction projects.
Power grid construction projects on the external stakeholders of benefit-sharing . Paper discusses the condition of complete information of the electric power company, grassroots organizations, local residents compensation mechanism of trilateral cooperation game. On this basis, Focusing on the behavioral characteristics of bargaining negotiations of the stakeholders of the external environment power grid construction and basing on a simple stakeholders ,the thesis constructs a compensation mechanism models about the power grid companies, grass-roots organizations and local residents. Analyze the kinds of mechanism through the simulation methods of Swarm, and verified the effectiveness of conflict in coordination compensation mechanism.Aim to design effective compensation mechanism for managers to safeguard interests of all parties, reduce the external conflicts, build a harmonious external environment of constructing power grids, and speed up construction of power grids to provide a scientific basis for further planning and decision support.
Finally, by analyzing the development process and effect of current situation of the enterprise project management of China's power grid, the paper explores the establishment and improvement of multi-stakeholder based on a common new model of governance, and gives some suggestions such as strengthening the system, establishing incentive and restraint mechanisms, strengthening power grid construction market credit-building, and improving market mechanism..
引文
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