摘要
气候变化问题日益受到人们的关注和重视。科学研究表明,其成因极有可能是来自大气中温室气体的过度累积。工业时代以来,人类在生产和消费活动中释放出了大量的二氧化碳,对气候均衡造成破坏,而人类自身也在遭受着因气候变化导致的严重损害。极端天气、粮食短缺、疾病蔓延…在这一系列无法回避的现实面前,人类终于深刻认识到了控制二氧化碳排放的必要性和紧迫性。
本文首先从经济学角度出发,以外部性理论和公共物品理论为基础,分析了二氧化碳过度排放的成因以及可能的解决途径。与行政管制、征收二氧化碳排放税等方式相比,基于产权理论的二氧化碳排放权交易在成本和效率方面有其内在优势,现已广泛应用于国际和国内领域。本文通过分析得出,在存在交易成本、市场势力等非完美市场条件下,这一交易机制的有效性将在很大程度上取决于产权(二氧化碳排放权)的初始配置,不同的配置模式和配置方法将对交易的成本和效率带来系统性影响。此外,由于现有能源替代效率和控排技术水平的限制,经济发展与二氧化碳排放之间存在着共生关系,这意味着国际层面的二氧化碳排放权分配结果将在很大程度上决定一个国家未来的发展空间。对处于较低发展水平的国家来说,二氧化碳排放权就是一种“发展权”,将影响其国民福利水平的改进可能和改进程度。
有鉴于二氧化碳排放权分配的重要性,本文在第四章提出将广泛应用于国际气候谈判中的“共同但有区别的责任”原则作为指导国际层面和我国国内排放权分配的基本原则。本章回顾了这一原则的形成历程,解读了这一原则的理论内涵,回应了目前针对这一原则的质疑和挑战,重申该原则继续作为全球气候治理行动之基本原则的合理性和正当性。为了阐释这一原则在指导二氧化碳排放权分配上的适用性,本章从产权理论出发,运用经济学分析方法,提出基于该原则的分配结果可带来全球边际福利水平的整体改进,符合产权配置的效率原则,而该原则的灵活性和包容性能够有效推动权利界定和权利配置的顺利开展,并保证产权界定和配置后的稳定及顺利实施。
在将“共同但有区别的责任”原则确定为二氧化碳排放权分配的基本原则之后,本文在第五章提出了基于该原则的国际排放权分配方法。通过对现有研究成果的梳理发现,由于各国研究人员大都从维护自己国家的利益出发,所提出的分配方案分歧明显,不同方案间往往无法兼容,甚至是彼此对立。发达国家的分配方案大多刻意回避其历史责任,且忽略了发展中国家的发展需要；而发展中国家的方案往往过分强调自身的劣势,将控排责任全部归于发达国家。为了打破这一僵局,本章提出从“共同但有区别的责任”原则出发,对目前基于“京都议定书”的分配模式进行改革。通过“共同”的概念,强调各国都是“温室效应”的始作俑者,同时也均是气候变化的受害者,因而都有义务和需要在气候治理行动中做出贡献。另一方面,通过“区别”的概念,充分考虑各个国家在人口、历史责任以及未来发展需要上的差异,提出了基于人口数量、累积排放量、转移排放量以及人类发展指数等多元化指标的分配方案。
在二氧化碳排放权的国内分配领域,注意到现有研究成果较多关注在从国家向企业进行排放权分配时,免费模式和拍卖模式的比较和取舍,往往忽略了由于我国地域广阔、行业种类及企业数量繁多,由国家直接向企业进行分配不仅程序繁杂而且成本庞大。此外,由于我国不同地区、不同行业(企业)间的差距明显,采用大一统的分配模式不仅有失公平,也缺乏效率。有鉴于此,本文在第六章提出将国内分配过程分解为区域分配和企业分配两个阶段,并基于“共同但有区别的责任”原则,提出了具体的分配方案。在区域分配阶段,通过“基于信息熵的多因子混合加权”分配模型,从控排责任、控排能力、控排潜力以及未来地区发展需要四个维度出发,构建二氧化碳排放权分配指标体系,并计算得出各个区域的二氧化碳排放权分配系数以及分配数量。在企业分配阶段,提出了从免费分配转向拍卖分配的分阶段运行模式,在缓解机制实施初期可能来自利益集团的阻碍之后,逐步强化“污染者”的责任承担,保证企业间的公平竞争,进一步调动企业的控排积极性,真正体现二氧化碳排放权的稀缺性价值。在这一过程中,关注到参与二氧化碳排放权交易的企业,由于其所属行业的异质性,国际竞争力水平将在不同程度上受到影响。有鉴于此,本文依据企业所属行业在能源密集度、控排能力以及成本转嫁能力上的差异,建立行业“暴露系数”,对企业所受影响程度进行具体度量。由于相较于拍卖分配,免费分配模式给企业带来的成本压力较小,因此建议在免费分配到拍卖分配的过渡中,对高“暴露系数”行业中的企业予以区别对待,如适度延长免费分配的时间,或在拍卖分配中为其预留免费分配额度,以减缓参与二氧化碳排放权交易给其造成的成本冲击,维护其国际竞争力。
在对全文研究成果进行系统总结之后,本文在第七章尝试提出了一些可供决策者参考的政策建议。包括：在有关二氧化碳排放权分配的国际谈判中展现负责任的大国形象,坚决维护“共同但有区别的责任”原则,积极推动该原则的法制化进程,力求国际二氧化碳排放权分配结果的公平性和合理性；在国内二氧化碳排放权分配中,建立有效的信息收集机制,排放权的登记和追踪机制,以及对排放源的监督和核查机制,力求国内二氧化碳排放权分配结果的科学性和有效性,为后续交易打下坚实的基础,在成本可控的前提下实现控排效果的最大化,从而有助于我国履行国际义务,实现低碳发展。
Numerous scientific studies show that climate change, which has been attracting more and more attention, is highly likely to be caused by the excessive accumulation of greenhouse gases in atmosphere. Since the industrial era, large amounts of CO2have been released from human activities and production processes, causing serious damage to the equilibrium of climate. Meanwhile, human beings have been increasingly aware of the necessity and urgency to control CO2emissions in the face of extreme weather conditions, food shortages and spread of disease caused by climate change.
From the perspective of economics, this paper starts from analysis on the causes for the excessive emissions of CO2and the possible solutions based on externality theory and public goods theory. Compared with administrative regulations and the imposition of carbon tax, the CO2emissions trading scheme, based on the theory of property rights, shows inherent advantages in cost and efficiency. Nowadays, this kind of mechanism has been widely used in international and domestic fields. The analysis in this paper suggests that in the presence of market imperfections, such as transaction costs and market power, the effectiveness of this mechanism is largely dependent on the initial allocation of property rights (i.e. the CO2emission permits).In fact, different allocation modes and methods will exert systematic influences on the trading cost and efficiency. In addition, attention is paid to pointing out the symbiotic relationship between economic development and CO2emissions, resulted from the limitation of energy substitution efficiency as well as the emission-control technology. It implies that international allocation of carbon emission permits plays a decisive role in a country's future development. For less developed countries, CO2emission is a kind of "right to development" and will affect the possibility and magnititude of welfare improvement of their citizens.
Given the importance of CO2emission permits allocation, Chapter four of this paper suggests that the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", widely used in international climate negotiations, should be used as the basic principle to guide the allocation of emission permits at home and abroad. In this chapter, energy is devoted to reviewing the formation of this principle, interpreting its connotation, coping with the doubts and challenges facing it, and reaffirming its rationality and legitimacy as the basic principle guiding global climate action. To elaborate its applicability to the allocation of CO2emission permits, this chapter stems from the theory of property rights and follows the research paradigm of economics to illustrate that the allocation results based on this principle may contribute to the overall improvement in marginal global welfare and consist with efficiency principle of the property allocation. It is proved that the flexibility and inclusiveness of this principle can effectively facilitate the delimitation and allocation of property rights, and ensure its stability and successful execution after delimitation and allocation.
With the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" being established as the basic principles of CO2emission permits allocation, Chapter five proposes international allocation method based on this principle. The sorting of existing researches shows that because researchers from different countries only focus attention on the interests of their own countries, the proposed allocation schemes differs significantly from each other, which are often incompatible and even in opposition to each other. To evade historical responsibilities, most allocation schemes employed by developed countries ignore the development needs of developing countries. On the other hand, the allocation schemes proposed by developing countries tend to overemphasize the disadvantages of their own country, and throw the full responsibility of emission control on developed countries. To break this deadlock, this chapter starts from the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" to reform the allocation modes in Kyoto Protocol. On the one hand, based on the concept of "common", this chapter emphasizes that countries worldwide are producers of greenhouse effect as well as the victims of climate change, and therefore, all of them are obligated and required to make contributions in climate mitigation action. On the other hand, based on the concept of "differentiated", this chapter gives full consideration to the difference in the population, historical responsibility and future development needs of countries worldwide, proposing multi-index allocation schemes based on the indices such as population size, cumulative emissions, transferred emissions and human development.
In domestic field of CO2emission permits allocation, existing researches focus more attention on the comparison and the selection of free and auction allocation modes, and ignores the complicated procedures and substantial cost when CO2emission permit is directly granted to enterprises by the State, resulting from the vast territory and the large quantities of industries and enterprises in China. In addition, the difference in regions and industries (enterprises) in China is so obvious that resorting to a unified allocation pattern is neither fair nor effective. In view of this, Chapter six decomposes the domestic allocation process into two stages including regional allocation and enterprise allocation, and brings forth specific allocation schemes based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities". During regional allocation, efforts are spent in constructing the indicator system of CO2emission permit allocation and calculating the allocation coefficient and quantity of CO2emission permits in each region by dint of "multifactor weight allocation model based on information entropy" from four aspects including emission control responsibilities, emission control ability, emission control potential and future regional development. During enterprise allocation, this chapter puts forward staged operation mode that shifts focus from free allocation mode to auction allocation mode. This process will ease the obstacles from interest groups during the early implementation of the trading scheme, and will gradually strengthen the responsibility of the polluters, guarantee the fair competition among enterprises, further mobilize enterprise enthusiasm in emission control, and truly reflect the scarcity value of CO2emission permits. Furthermore, it is noted that the international competitiveness of the enterprises involved in the CO2trading scheme is influenced by industrial heterogeneity to varying degrees. In consideration of this, the "industrial exposure factor" is constructed to measure the influence on enterprises based on the difference in energy intensity, emission reduction ability and cost transfer capacity. Compared with the auction allocation, free allocation is less costly. Therefore, it is suggested that during the transition from free allocation to auction allocation, the enterprises in industries with high exposure factor should be treated differently from various aspects, such as, prolonging the time of free allocation or reserving the allowance of free allocation in auction allocation mode for the purpose of reducing cost impact and maintaining its international competitiveness.
After systematic conclusion on the research achievements herein, Chapter seven attempts to put forward some policy suggestions for decision makers. On the one hand, in the international negotiation of CO2emission permit allocation, the suggestions include displaying the image of a great responsible country, firmly upholding the principle of'"common but differentiated responsibilities", and actively boosting the legalized process of this principle to realize the fairness and rationality of the allocation results of international CO2emission permits. On the other hand, as regards the allocation of domestic CO2emission permits, the effective information collection mechanisms, the registration and tracking mechanisms of emission permits, and the supervision and inspection mechanisms of the emission sources are recommended to be established to achieve scientific and effective allocation of domestic CO2emission permits and lay a solid foundation for subsequent transactions. By this way, emission control effect will be maximized to assist China in fulfilling its international obligations and then attaining low-carbon development on the basis of controllable
引文
① 注：“温室气体”是指大气中自然或人为产生的的气态成分,能够吸收和释放地球表面、大气和云发出的热红外辐射光谱内特定波长的辐射,并将其俘获在地表,从而导致“温室效应”。《联合国气候变化框架公约》和《京都议定书》中主要涉及二氧化碳、甲烷、氧化亚氮、氢氟碳化物、全氟化碳和六氟化硫六种温室气体。其中二氧化碳由于占比最大,最为受到人们关注,而国际惯例也是将其他温室气体折算成二氧化碳当量来计算排放量或控排量。
② 参见《联合国气候变化框架公约》第二条。
③ 参见《京都议定书》附件A,附件B。
① 参见《京都议定书》第十匕条、第六条和第十二条。
② 注：每一个单位的AAU对应一公吨二氧化碳当量。
③ 参见《京都议定书》第三条第7款和第8款。
① 参见《联合国气候变化框架公约》第二条。
① 参见《里约环境与发展宣言》第十五条原则,以及《联合国气候变化框架公约》第三条。
② 注：美国橡树岭国家实验室二氧化碳信息分析中心(Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center,文中简称"CDIAC")
③ 注：GtC表示十亿吨碳。碳排放量与二氧化碳排放量之间的转换系数为3.67。即1吨碳排放量折合3.67吨二氧化碳排放量。
① 参见《联合国气候变化框架公约》第四条。
① 参见：《国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》。
① 参见《联合国人类环境宣言》中第七条声明。
② 参见《联合国人类环境宣言》中第二十四条原则。
③ 参见《联合国人类环境宣言》中第十二条原则。
④ 参见《联合国人类环境宣言》中第九条原则。
⑤ 参见《联合国人类环境宣言》中第二十三条原则。
① 参见《关于消耗臭氧层物质的蒙特利尔协议书》的相关内容。
② 参见《里约环境与发展宣言》第六条和第七条原则,《联合国气候变化框架公约》第三条以及《生物多样性公约》序言部分。
① 参见《里约环境与发展宣言》第六条和第七条原则。
② 参见《联合国气候变化框架公约》第三条。
③ 参见《联合国气候变化框架公约》、《里约环境和发展宣言》的相关内容。
① 参见《京都议定书》第三条。
① 参见《联合国气候变化框架公约》前言。
① 参见《联合国宪章》第一条。
① 参见《2010年人类发展报告》(联合国开发计划署,2010)
① 参见欧盟委员会《Directive 2009/29/EC》。
② 参见《美国清洁能源和安全法》。
① 注：本部分研究框架参考了姜晓川(2012)。
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