摘要
进入21世纪,我国连续出台7个指导农业和农村工作的中央1号文件,国家财政支农支出力度持续增强。但是,目前我国的贫富分化在急剧加速,城乡差距已达到历史最高水平。那么,就有必要研究这些问题:政府如此大力度的支农政策为什么没有起到明显的效果呢?农村公共支出促进农业增长的机制是什么?对此问题的回答能够为提高我国支农政策的效果,促进农业发展提供借鉴意义。
为此,本文对我国农村公共支出促进农业增长的机制展开研究,并试图从理论和实证上回答上述问题。
首先,本文研究了不同来源的公共支出影响农业增长的机制。
文献回顾说明,以往的内生增长模型中的公共支出仅仅来自经济系统内部,但是我国农村公共支出是由内部来源和外部来源共同构成的。为此,本文对内生增长模型进行了扩展研究。研究表明,农村公共支出的混合来源形式对于农业发展具有现实意义;在农村公共支出混合来源形式下,两个来源均能够合理地成为经济增长的内生因素,对农业增长产生促进作用。并且,外部来源的公共支出对内部来源具有引致效果,说明了在农村公共支出中国家财政支出的主导地位。
公共支出推动经济内生增长的机理分析表明,内部来源的公共支出通过刺激和增加私人部门在知识资本、人力资本、R&D等方面的投资,进而提高经济增长率。而公共支出的外部来源主要通过收入效应和替代效应对内部来源产生了引致作用。
然后,在我国农村公共支出对农业增长影响的实证研究中,利用协整检验和Granger因果关系检验方法,检验了农村公共支出两个来源对农业增长的影响,以及两个来源之间的关系。实证研究结果表明,我国农村公共支出两个来源对农业增长均有促进作用,但是,两个来源之间是替代关系。Granger因果检验显示,这种替代并不是由于农户自身的公共支出过多从而“民进国退”的正常现象,而是由于外部来源的欠缺,逼迫农户不得不增加内部来源的公共支出,以适应农业生产对公共支出日益增高的需求。由此说明我国财政支农支出政策有必要进行调整。而以农产品补贴为例的我国财政支农支出实践研究,则进一步强化了对政策调整的必要性的认识。
最后,本文研究了财政支农支出不同方式对农业生产的影响机制。
以促进粮食生产、保障粮食安全为目标,根据我国粮食生产的现状,本文从消除农地抛荒、提高粮食单产、推广粮食新品种和新耕作技术三个方面比较分析了不同粮食直接补贴机制的激励效率。研究表明,当农地抛荒现象比较严重时,对农户实行按面积补贴的直补机制要优于按产出补贴;若不存在农地抛荒,则按产出补贴要优于按面积补贴;而同时按面积和按产出进行补贴的混合补贴机制存在内在冲突性,政府无法设计出最优的补贴政策。若不计补贴成本,混合机制可以实现更高的粮食产出,但政府和农户的期望效用会降低;进一步,若在现行按产出进行比例补贴的基础上附加一个转移支付,则会增加农户提高粮食单产的激励,进而提高粮食总产出和政府的期望效用。但分散化、小规模农业经营模式所固有的道德风险问题使得这一补贴机制目前可能难以推行。
若政府希望通过推广新品种、新技术提高粮食产出,则粮食直补机制的设计就变成一个典型的多任务激励问题。本文首先从理论上证明,如果任务间的产出分布正相关,或任务间的重要性存在差异,则最优的激励合约可以是对抗性,即在提高一种任务激励强度的同时必须降低另一任务的激励强度。这就从理论上拓展了现有关于多任务间的激励强度必须互补的经典结论。而从粮食补贴政策的实践上看,这一结论要求对老品种和新品种的产出实施差别补贴,特别地,如果新品种的推广对政府而言非常重要,那么对其补贴的强度应该严格高于老品种;若政府让不同类型的农户分别从事老品种和新品种的生产,则政府能够从这种专业化分工模式中获得更高的净剩余;而在专业化生产模式中,对农户实行按相对业绩比较的补贴政策可以进一步提高政府效用。
以促进农业科技企业发展,引导传统农业向现代农业转型为目标,本文从农业科技企业在发展早期阶段的自有资本投入作为研究对象,研究了不同财政资助机制对农业科技企业吸引外部股权资本所起的不同作用。研究表明,公共资本对早期阶段农业科技企业进行资助的意义在于,它可以促成自有资本投入不足的项目得到股权资本的支持,从而壮大农业科技创新活动的规模。但若公共资本要求按比例分享项目收益,则这种有偿资助无论是从扩大农业科技创新活动规模还是从政府期望收益的角度都比不上无偿资助;而仅要求固定回报的有偿资助机制则是激励中性的,它与无偿资助几乎具有相同的性质。这一结论具有非常重要的现实意义:通过对处于早期阶段的农业科技企业实行债权融资担保,利用外部债权资本代替财政资本投入,一方面可以大大减轻政府的财政负担,另一方面它对农业科技企业的扶持作用与政府财政资本的无偿直接投入等同。
本文的主要创新之处在于:
①通过分化农村公共支出的来源,对内生增长理论基本模型进行扩展,克服了既有文献中公共支出往往来源于经济系统内部,而没有研究来源于外部的公共支出影响的局限性,从理论上明确了国家财政支农支出在农村公共支出中的主导地位和作用。同时,通过实证研究揭示了在我国农村公共支出中外部来源和内部来源之间出现替代关系的原因和不合理性,为我国财政支农支出政策调整提供了现实依据。
②通过对不同粮食直补机制的比较研究,明确了不同资助政策的适用范围,指出了现行政策在促进粮食生产新品种、新耕作技术方面存在的局限性,并进一步指出了未来补贴政策调整的方向。同时,本文还在理论上拓展了多任务委托代理理论的经典结论,找到了对高风险、重要任务实施强激励的理论依据。
③通过对农业科技企业不同融资资助机制的比较研究,从效率的角度明确了公共资本资助的意义,并证明按比例分享收益的有偿资助严格劣于无偿资助,而仅要求固定回报的有偿资助则是激励中性的,它并不影响农业科技创新活动规模,也不影响创新项目的成功率。这一结论为处于财政约束下的融资资助机制指明了一个现实可操作的方向。
Since the 21st century, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China has issued 7 the 1st documents, the public expenditure supporting agriculture has being strengthened continually. But, the gap between the rich and the poor in our country was in the slam acceleration. The gap between the city and countryside has achieved the historical maximum level. Then, it has the necessity to study these questions: why do we not take the tangible effect while the government has issued so great supporting agriculture policies? What is the mechanism of the countryside public expenditure promoting agriculture growth? It has significance to reply these questions for us to enhance the effect of our policy supporting agriculture, and promote the development of our agriculture.
First, this thesis has studied the mechanism which the different origin's public expenditure influence agriculture growth.
The literature review of public expenditure in endogenous growth theory showed that former models of endogenous growth had not split up rural public expenditure’s origin. So, This thesis had to expand the endogenous growth model. The expansive research indicated that, the countryside public product's mix origin has the practical significance regarding to the agriculture growth; by the way of mix origin, two origins could become the endogenous factor of economic growth reasonably, has the promoter action to the agricultural growth. And, the exterior origin has the bringing about effect to the interior origin, which explained the dominant position of state finance expenditure in rural public expenditure.
In the analysis to mechanism of rural public expenditure promoting economy endogenous growth, this thesis indicated that the common mechanism of public expenditure promoting economy endogenous growth is by the government stimulating and increasing the personal department through knowledge capital, human capital, investments on R&D and so on, then raises the rate of long-term economic growth. The analysis indicated that the exterior origin of rural public expenditure brought about the internal origin through the income effect and the substitution effect mainly.
Then, in the empirical study on influence of public expenditure to our agricultural growth, we examined influence of two origins in the countryside public expenditure to the agricultural growth, as well as relations between two origins by co-integration test and Granger test. The result of empirical study indicated that, two origins of our rural public expenditure have the promoter action to the agricultural growth, but, two origin’s relationship is substitutive and unreasonable, which explained that it have the necessity to adjust the state finance expenditure in rural public expenditure. The Granger test demonstrated that this kind of substitution is not because the supply of public product from our peasant is sufficient excessively, thus the exterior supply draws back reasonably, but short because the insufficient from the exterior supply forced the peasant to increase the public expenditure by themselves in order to adapt the demand to the public product for agricultural production which increased day by day. And taking agricultural product subsidy as example, the research on practice of our state finance expenditure supporting agriculture further strengthened the understanding to the necessity of adjustment.
Finally, this thesis has studied the mechanism which the different way of financial expenditure supporting agriculture influence the agricultural production.
By the goal of promoting the food production and food security, according to our country food production's present situation, this thesis researched efficiency of the different grain direct grants mechanism comparatively, background of three aspect as eliminating the farmland to go out of cultivation, enhancing the grain per unit area yield, and promoting grain new variety and the new cultivation technique. The research indicated that when the phenomenon that farmland goes out of cultivation is quite serious, the subsidy according to the area surpasses that according to output, otherwise, the subsidy according to output the surpasses that according to area; But the mix subsidy mechanism exist intrinsic conflict, the government is unable to design the most superior subsidy policy. If does not count the subsidy cost, the mix mechanism may realize a higher grain to deliver, but the government and peasant household's expected utility will reduce; Furthermore, attaching a transfer payment in present subsidy according to output will increase the peasant household to enhance the grain per unit area yield, and then enhance the grain total output and government's expected utility. But the moral hazard in decentralization and small scale farming business causes this subsidy mechanism impossibly to be carried out at present.
When the government hoped to enhance the grain through promoting the new variety and the new technology, and if the distribution of the duty’s output is related, or the importance of duty is difference, then the most superior drive contract may be an antagonism. This developed the classical conclusion that excitation density must be supplementary during the multi-duty theoretically. But from practice of the grain subsidy policy, this conclusion request to implement difference subsidy to the old variety and the new variety, specially, if the new variety is important to the government, then should be higher than the old variety strictly to its subsidy's intensity; If the government typed the peasant household by using old variety and the new variety separately, then the government can obtain a higher net surplus from this kind of specialized decompose jig in the formula; But in the specialized production pattern, the subsidy policy of relative achievement comparison may further enhance the government effectiveness.
By the goal to promote the agriculture technology corporation in order to reform traditional farming to modern agriculture, taking own capital investment of the agriculture technology corporation in the development early time stage as the object, this thesis studied the different function of different financial aid policy to attract the exterior stockholder's rights capital institute to the agriculture technology corporation. The research indicated that the significance that the public capital carries on the subsidization to the early stage of agriculture technology corporation lies that, it may facilitate the project which own capital investment is insufficient to have support from the stockholder's rights capital, thus strength the scale of agriculture scientific innovation. But if the public capital requests to share the project income in proportion, then this kind of paid subsidization does not compare the free subsidization, regardless of the scale of agriculture scientific innovation and the expected revenue of government; But the subsidization policy which only requests fixed return is drives neutrally, it has the same nature nearly with the free subsidization. This conclusion has the important significance for reality enlightenment: the creditor's rights financing guarantee at the early stage of the agriculture technology corporation uses the exterior creditor's rights capital to replace the financial capital investment, that may lighten government's financial burden greatly, on the other hand, it equates to free direct investment from the government speaking of support function to the agriculture technology corporation.
The innovations of this thesis are as follows:
①Through splitting up the origin of countryside public expenditure and carrying on the expansion to the fundamental model of endogenous growth theory, this thesis overcame the limitation in the former literatures that the public expenditure stem from the economic system, but did not research the influence of exterior public expenditure, theoretically has been clear about the dominant position and the function of state finance expenditure supporting agriculture in the countryside public expenditure. At the same time, has promulgated the reason and unfairness OF the substitution relations between the exterior origin and the interior origin through the empirical study, has provided the reality basis for policy adjustment to state finance expenditure supporting agriculture.
②The research on the different grain mechanism has been clear about the scope of different subsidization policy, pointed out the limitation of present policies for promoting food production of new variety and new cultivation technique, and further pointed out the direction for the subsidization policy adjustment in the future. At the same time, this article has developed classical conclusion by the multi-duty principal-agent theory theoretically, found the theory basis to implement the strong drive in the high risk and important task.
③The research on the different financing subsidization mechanism in order to develop the agriculture technology corporation has been clear about the significance of public capital subsidization, and the paid subsidization for proportionate share income is inferior to the free subsidization strictly, but the subsidization mechanism which only requests fixed return is drives neutrally, it does not affect the scale of agriculture scientific innovation, also does not affect the success ratio of the innovation project. This conclusion indicated the direction of the financing subsidization mechanism under the financial restraint.
引文
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