摘要
受宏观调控影响，项目成本领先已成为房地产企业的核心竞争力之一，一些房地产企业提出价值创造的理念，把成本管理的重心前移，进行目标成本管理，然而，国内很多企业的“目标成本”并非由价值工程分析，而是由造价指标测算得来，实际上是“责任成本”，由于项目前期阶段非对称信息普遍存在，这种“目标成本管理”不能满足的成本管理的需要。本项研究以非对称信息条件下的房地产企业成本管理为切入点，采用博弈、数学规划及统计数值分析等方法，通过理论及实证分析发现，在非对称信息下，采用目标成本管理，会扩大代理双方的博弈，引发棘轮效应，不利资源整合及价值创造，也会造成成本得到控制而品质却下降的局面，因此，房地产成本管理需要改变以“控”代“管”的现状。
首先，总结归纳了国内外成本管理及激励理论的研究结果，论述了成本管理的发展历程及相关方法，分析了我国的房地产成本管理现状，阐述了激励机制的理论分析及应用型模型。其次，在理论分析的基础上，针对项目开发的不同阶段、不同代理事务、信息对称与非对称的不同情况，提出不同的成本管理策略，并对精细化成本管理作出新解，指出精细化成本管理的误区，进而增加成本动因分析，提倡目标成本与作业成本管理相融合。然后，在非对称信息下，引入激励管理方法，以激励替代责任成本的控制，减少博弈，鼓励代理人整合资源及价值创造。最后，对当前项目成本管理流程进行了改善，提出新的管理流程，在可研策划及方案设计阶段引入激励管理，以适应项目前期成本的特点。
由于传统的激励机制存在参数过多、激励力度不合理、不符合经营习惯等局限性，阻碍了其推广和应用。因此，本论文构建一种新型的应用型主动激励模型，改变传统模型的线性激励，加大激励力度，使奖罚机制渐趋科学；解决传统模型的局限性，可减少代理双方的博弈风险；能有效防止棘轮效应，使得代理人保持努力工作成为常态，从而能更好适应房地产前期非对称信息条件下的成本管理。另外，采用主动激励模型能够有效的替代斯宾塞劳动力市场模型分析模型，降低信息传递的偏离，有利房地产企业甄别出能力强又愿意为代理事务付出较高努力水平的代理人。本研究对该模型下的逆向选择及道德风险问题分别建立最优规划问题模型进行分析，并有以下发现：
1.逆向选择的问题上，模型使得高专业水平代理人和低专业水平代理人的产出水平与信息完备时比均未发生扭曲，能有效避免高专业水平代理人模仿低专业水平代理人的倾向，而且使得低专业水平代理人的产出也保持在较优水平，使得房地产企业不需抬高产出标准，因而，代理人会更愿意接受主动激励机制所构建的合同，能有效促使代理人加大人力及资源配置，使得代理人的工作效率得以改善。
2.道德风险问题上，主动激励机制可用较小的提成比例来激励代理人达到信息对称时同样的努力水平，能够引导代理人在合同初期勇敢地报出真实的产出水平，在代理事务实施时，理性的代理人会按自身的能力和资源采取真实的行为。同时本研究还指出了激励效果及风险的影响因素，这些因素包括：努力影响系数、外界不确因素、绝对风险规避度量及提成比例等，并分析了各因素之间的相互作用关系。
针对施工单位可以把剩余价值全部占有，激励机制对其可能会失去作用的情况，本论文又提出一体化和长期合作的策略，作为激励机制的延伸和补充。经建立模型分析表明一体化策略将外部代理转为内部代理，可扩大激励的力度，尤其能解决激励机制对外部施工单位没最优解的问题。通过动态博弈分析表明长期合作中代理人为了将来获取更多的收益，会保持更好的声誉，保持努力工作的状态。
最后，通过对广州地区23个房地产开发工程成本数据进行方差分析，发现各分项工程的系统误差比较离散，最低的项目前期工程为14.9%，最高的的机电工程是81.8%，这表明不同项目的工程成本存在较大的不确定，导致项目开发前期非对称信息普遍存在，证实传统单一的责任成本管理存在一定的弊端。同时，通过算例分析证实主动激励机制能很好地应用于房地产企业的内部及外部代理事务中，具有较好的实操性，可以取得良好的效果，能在一定程度上解决逆向选择和道德风险的问题。
综合上述，现在房地产企业已把成本管理的重心移至项目开发前期，虽然把握好了成本控制的“时间”，却忽略了成本控制的“空间”，对非对称信息的影响及成本成因考虑不足，本文分析了非对称信息条件情况下成本管理的特点，提出以激励代替控制的理念，以适应新形势下，房地地产企业成本管理的需求。宏观上，有利于优化资源配置，减少社会经济的浪费。微观上，有利于房地产企业进行价值创造，增强竞争力。
Impacted by macro-control, project cost leadership has become one of the corecompetencies in real estate business. A number of real estate enterprises have proposed theconcept of value creation, shifting the cost management focus forward and conducting the targetcost management. However, the "target cost" of many domestic enterprises is not analyzedthrough value engineering; instead, it is estimated from the construction cost index, thus it isactually the "liability cost". The "target cost management" cannot meet the needs of costmanagement due to the ubiquitous asymmetric information at the project early stage. This studytakes the cost management in real estate enterprise in the context of asymmetric information asthe starting point, adopting game theory, mathematical programming, statistical and numericalanalyses and other methods. Through the theoretical and empirical analysis, it is found that inthe context of asymmetric information, the use of target cost management will expand the gamebetween the agent and the principal, causing the ratchet effect, which is unfavorable for resourceintegration and value creation, and resulting in deteriorating quality though the costs are undercontrol. Therefore, it is necessary to change the status quo of "controlling" instead of“managing” in the cost management of real estate.
Firstly, the findings of cost management and the incentive theories at home and abroadhave been summarized, the development process of cost management and related methods havebeen discussed, analyzing the status quo of China's real estate cost management, elaborating thetheoretical analysis on incentive mechanism and application-oriented model. Secondly, on thebasis of the theoretical analysis, various cost management strategies have been proposedrespectively for different stages of project development, different agent services and differentsituations of symmetric and asymmetric information. Moreover, new solutions have been madefor refined cost management, pointing out the pitfalls in refined cost management, thusincreasing the cost driver analysis and advocating the integration of target cost and operatingcost management. Then, in the context of the asymmetric information, the incentivemanagement practices have been introduced to motivate vicarious liability cost control,reducing the game to encourage agents to integrate resources and value creation. Finally, thearticle has improved the cost management process of the current project, put forward the newmanagement process, and introduced incentive management into the feasibility study andschematic design phase to adapt to the characteristics of the cost of the earlier stage of theproject.
The promotion and application of the traditional incentive mechanism has been hindered due to its limitations with too many parameters, unreasonable incentive strength, notconforming to the operating practices and so on. Therefore, a new application-oriented activeincentive model is built in this paper, changing the linear incentive of traditional model andincreasing the incentive strength, so that the reward and punishment mechanism can becomemore scientific; it solves the limitations of the traditional model and can reduce the game risksof the agent and the principal; it can effectively prevent the ratchet effect, making it common forthe agents to keep working hard, so that it can better meet the cost management in the context ofasymmetric information at the early stage of a real estate project. In addition, adopting the activeincentive model can effectively replace the Analysis Model of Spence’s Job Market SignalingModel, and reduce the deviation of information transmission, enabling the real estate business tofind about the highly capable agents who are willing to work harder for agency affairs. In thisstudy, the optimal planning models have been established and analyzed for the reverse selectionand moral risk issues respectively under the model. And the following has been found:
1. Concerning the issue of reverse selection, the model makes sure that there is nodistortion in the output levels of high professional-level agents and low professional-levelagents compared with those when the information is complete. It effectively avoids thetendency of high professional-level agents following the example of low professional-levelagents, and also makes the output of the low professional-level agents maintain the optimumlevel, making it unnecessary for the real estate enterprises to raise the output criteria. Therefore,the agents will be more willing to accept the contract entered into under the active incentivemechanism, effectively encouraging the agents to increase the labor and resource allocation, sothat the agent's productivity can be improved.
2. Concerning the issue of the moral risk, the active incentive mechanism can motivate theagent to reach the same level of effort as in the context of information symmetry with smallercommission rate, and guide the agent to bravely report the real output level at the initial stage ofcontract period. The rational agents will take real actions according to their own capability andresources when handling agency matters. In the meantime, the study also points out the factorsimpacting the incentive effect and risk, including effort influence coefficient, externaluncertainty factor, absolute risk aversion measure and commission rate and etc, and analyzes theinteraction among these factors.
The paper also proposes the strategy for integration and long-term cooperation, as anextension and a supplement to the incentive mechanism considering that the builders may takeall surplus value and the incentive mechanism may become uneffective to them. The modelinganalysis shows that the external agency is converted to the internal agency by the integration strategy, which can expand the incentive efforts; in particular, it can solve the problem of theincentive mechanism failing to have the optimal solution to the external builder problem. Itshows through dynamic game analysis that the agent will maintain better reputation and keepworking hard in order to earn more revenue in the future in the long-term cooperation.
Finally, through the variance analysis of development cost data in23real estate projects inGuangzhou, it is found that the system errors of subdivisional projects are relatively discrete,with the minimum (preliminary project work) being14.9%, and the maximum (electrical andmechanical work) being81.8%. It indicates that there is big uncertainty in the engineering costsof different projects, which results in prevalent asymmetric information in the preliminary stageof project development and confirms that there are some drawbacks in the traditional singleliability cost management. Meanwhile, a calculation example demonstrates that the activeincentive mechanism can be well applied to the internal and external agency affairs of realestate enterprises, which is rather practical and is able to achieve good results and solve theproblems of reverse selection and moral risks to a certain extent.
In summary, existing real estate enterprises have shifted the focus of cost management topreliminary stage of project development. Although the "timing" of cost control is under goodcontrol, the "space" of cost control is ignored, and inadequate consideration has been given tothe impact of asymmetric information and cost causes. This paper analyzes the features of costmanagement in the context of asymmetric information, and proposes the idea of motivatinginstead of controlling to adapt to the needs of cost management of real estate enterprises in thenew situation. Macrocosmically, it helps optimize resource allocation and reduce social andeconomic wastes. Microcosmically, it aids real estate enterprises in creating value, enhancingcompetencies.
引文
[1]肖元真,陈达,朱少麟.国外房地产市场发展的基本状况和政策调控-以日、美、俄、新加城四国为例[J].长江论坛,2006,(78):87-90
[2]中国房地产动态政策设计研究组.海外房地产市场专题分析[R].北京:中国指数研究院,2012
[3]中国房地产动态政策设计研究组．从十八大看房地产业走势[R]．北京:中国指数研究院,2012
[4]申广平.房地产成本管理突出问题及对策研究[D].上海市:上海交通大学,2012
[5]李阳. S房地产开发公司M项目开发成本控制方法的研究[D].沈阳:阳建筑大学,2011
[6]搜房网[DB/OL]. http://newhouse.cq.soufun.com
[7]中国经济信息网[DB/OL]. http://www.cei.gov.cn
[8]上海易居房地产研究院．2011-2012年度全国房地产市场研究报告[R]．上海:上海易居房地产研究院,2012
[9]国家统计局网站[DB/OL]. http://www.stats.gov.cn
[10]前瞻产业研究院.2012年4月全国商品房销售额情况分析[DB/OL]．前瞻网http://www.qianzhan.com,2012.5.5
[11]丁祖昱.2012房地产市场展望[DB/OL].易居购房网http://www.eju.com,2012.6
[12]师洋,张红莉,刘丽杰.2012年三季度百城住宅地价格报告[R]．北京：中国指数研究院,2012
[13]仲量联行大中华区分公司.巨龙腾飞:2012年中国公司企业房地产调查报告[R].上海:仲量联行,2012
[14]中国房地产TOP10研究组．2012中国房地产百强研究报告[R]．北京:中国房地产TOP10研究组,2012.3
[15]张勇强.房地产开发企业的成本控制[D].南京:南京师范大学,2004
[16]张驰.房地产项目目标成本控制理论探讨及其实践[D].天津市:天津大学,2010
[17] Babad, Balachandran. Cost driver optimization in axtivity-baased costing[J]. TheAccounting Review,1993,7:116-118
[18] Homburg C. A Note on Optimal Cost Driver Selection in ABC[J]. ManagementAccounting Research.2001,12(2):197-205
[19]路娟.目标成本管和作业成本管理融合研究[D].青岛:中国海洋大学,2010.5
[20]成晓卿.作业成本法成本动因优化理论和方法的研究综述[J].科技情报开发与经济,2011,8(21):182-183
[21] Kim Soin, Willie Seal, John Cullen. ABC and Organizational Perspective[J].Management Accounting Research,2003,14(3):246-248
[22]美国项目管理协会.项目管理知识体系[M].北京:电子工业出版社,2009:331-428
[23]弗雷德里克·泰勒.科学管理原理[M].黄榛译.北京:北京理工大学出版社,2012:157-235
[24] Thompson A.A., Strickland A.J.. Strategic management: Concepts and cases[M].McGraw-Hill companies,2003:72-109
[25]乐艳芬.战略成本管理和企业竞争优势[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2006:11-53
[26]王敬伟. YG房地产公司精细化成本控制应用研究[D].济南市:山东大学,2011.5
[27]黄丽艳.住宅开发项目目标成本控制研究[D].大连市:东北财经大学,2010.11
[28]毕星.基于项目管理理论的工程项目成本管理系统研究[D].天津市：天津大学,2006.5
[29]田芳.基于行为经济学的房地产企业项目经理激励机制分析[D].长沙市:中南大学,2008
[30]王秀珉,庄江梅.激励理论与成本管理[J].第一军医大学分校学报,2005,28(2):147-148
[31]郝辽钢,刘健西.激励理论研究的新趋势[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2003,18(5):12-17
[32] Alderfer C.P. Existence, Relatedness and Crowth: human needs in organizationalsettings [M]. New York: The Free Press,1972:67-118
[33] Vroom V.H.. Work and Motivation[M]. Florida: Krieger Publisher,1982:33-99
[34]许学梅,嵆东海,许方维.激励研究综述及展望[J].经济研究导刊,2009,59(21):116-117
[35]胡静. HU理论的拓展研究[D].杭州市:浙江工商大学,2010
[36]樊斌.非合作博弈条件下企业内部知识共享激励机制研究[D].哈尔滨市:哈尔滨工业大学,2009.4
[37]张婷.合生创展集团高层管理者激励机制研究[D].西安市:西北大学,2007.12.
[38]董志勇.行为经济学原理[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2006
[39] Hagel, J.H., Roth A.E.. The Handbook of Experimental Economics[J]. PrincetonUniversity Press,1995
[40] Abraham Maslow. A Theory of Human Motivation[J]. Psychological Review,1943:150-160
[41]张英奎,孙军.现代管理学[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2004:15-36
[42] McClelland DC. Toward a Theory of Motive Acquisition[J]. American Psychologist.1965,20(5):321-333
[43] Alderfer C.P.. An Empirical Test of a New Theory of Human Needs[J]. OrganizationalBehavior and Human Performance.1969,4(2):142-175
[44]罗伯特·G·欧文斯.组织行为学[M].第七版.窦卫霖,温建平,王越.上海市:华东师范大学出版社,2001:23-59
[45] Frederick Herzberg. Motivation-hygiene Profiles: Pinpointing What AiLs theOrganization[J]. Organizational Dynamics.1974,3(2):18-29
[46] Jones S.C., Vroom V.H.. Division of Labor and Performance under Cooperative andCompetitive Conditions[J]. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.1964,68(3):313-320
[47]斯蒂芬P.罗宾斯著.《管理学》[M].第11版.李原,孙健敏,黄小勇.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2012:113-176
[48] J. Stacy Adams. Inequity in Social Exchange[J]. Advances in Experimental SocialPsychology.1966,(2):267-299
[49] Bengt Holmstrom. Design of Incentive Schemes and the New Soviet Incentive Model[J].European Economic Review.1982,17(2):127-148
[50]王振.论归因理论在人力资源管理领域中的应用[J].商场现代化,2006,(24):310-311
[51] Locke E.A.. Relationship of Success and Expectation to Affect on Goal-seeking Tasks[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.1967,7(2):125-134
[52] Skinner B.F., Morse W.H.. Concurrent Activity under Fixed-interval Reinforcement[J].Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology.1957,50(3):279~281
[53]薛求知,黄佩燕,鲁直等.行为经济学:理论与应用[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2003.
[54] Lawler E.E., Porter L.W.. Antecedent Attitudes of Effective Managerial Performance[J].Organizational Behavior and Human Performance.1967,2(2):122~142
[55] House R.J., Rizzo J.R.. Role Conflict and Ambiguity as Critical Variables in a Model ofOrganizational Behavior[J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance.1972,7(3):467-505
[56] Brown Donald. Increasing Returns and the Share Economy[J]. Journal of ComparativeEconomics.1986,10(4):454-456
[57] Samuelson P.. A Note On Measurement of Utility[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1973,4:155-161
[58]陈亮亮.以企业价值为基础的报酬激励制度研究[D].北京:北京交通大学,2011
[59]孙惟微.赌客信条:你不可不知的行为经济学[M].北京:电子工业出版社,2010:89-137
[60] Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision underRisk[J]. Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-269
[61]龚六堂.贴现因子、偏好和行为经济学[J].财经问题研究,2004,8:3-9
[62] Michael Gootzeit, Johannes Schneider, William Smith. Mashallian Recursive Preferencesand Growth[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2002
[63] Becker G.S., Mulligan C.B.. The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997, August:729-758
[64]戴中亮.委托代理理论述评[J].商业研究,2004,303(19):98-100
[65] Jensen M.C, Murphy K.J.. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives[J]. Journalof Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-263
[66]李志敏.非营利知识型组织柔性绩效评价与超契约激励研究[D].天津:天津大学,2007
[67]羊爱军,白杨青.激励理论相关进展研究综述[J].中小企业管理与科技,2009,(33):69-70
[68]张跃平,刘荆敏.委托-代理激励理论实证研究综述[J].经济学动态,2003,6:74-78
[69] Schatteler H., Sung J.. The First-Order Approach to the Continuous–TimePrincipal-Agent Problem With Exponential Utility[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,61,1993:331-372
[70] Sung J.. Optimal Contracts under Aduverse Selection and Moral Hazard:AContinuous-Time Approach[J]. Review of Finanical Studies,2005,18:1021-1073
[71] Hui Qu-Yang. Optimal Contracts in a Continuous-Time Delegated Portfolio ManagementProblem[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2003,16(1):173-208.
[72]刘兵,张世英.企业激励理论综述与展望[J].理论与方法,1999,5:21-23
[73]杨浩.现代企业理论与运行[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004:211-276
[74]智库百科网[DB/OL]. http://wiki.mbalib.com
[75] Harris M., Raviv A.. Corporate control contests and Capital structure[J]. Financial Econ.1991,20:55-86
[76] Holmstrom B., Milgrom P.. The firm as an incentive system. American EconomicReview.1994,84(4):927-991
[77] Mullins L.J.. Mangagement and Organizational Behavior[M]. Pirman Publishing,1996:171-211
[78] Alderfer C. P.. Existence, Relatedness and Growth[M]. Collier Macmillan,1972:57-113
[79] Jay Liebowitz. Building Organizational Itelligence: A Knowledge ManagementPrimer[M]. CRC Press Inc,1999:76-102
[80] Ross S.A.. The Economic Theory ofAgency: The Principal’s Problem[J].AmericanEconomic Review,1973,63(2):134-139
[81] Spence M., Zeckhauser R.. Insurance, Information and Individual Action[J]. AmericanEconomic Review,1971,61(2):380-387
[82]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004
[83] Bernardo A.E., Cai H., Luo J.. Capital Budgeting and Compensation with AsymmetricInformation and Moral Hazard[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2001,61:311-344
[84]胡祖光.“联合确定基数法”对策论模型—一个通俗的阐述[J].商业经济与管理,2001,114(4):8-12
[85] Weizman M.L. The new Soviet incentive model [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1976,7(Spring):251-257
[86]吴一丁,毛克贞.激励引导模型的改进研究[J].经济与管理研究,2006,07:59-63
[87]李晓谦,张志峰,曾华,王建泰.委托代理关系中基于激励机制建立的基数确定模型[J].财会月刊,2009,5:48-50
[88]张维迎.企业的企业家-契约理论[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1995:79-138
[89]徐传湛.论企业家行为激励与约束机制[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1997.28-35
[90]张磊.委托代理问题求解方法的研究及应用[D].北京市:北京邮电大学,2008.5
[91]中国知网[DB/OL]. http://www.cnki.net
[92]谢进.大新房地产有限公司项目经理激励机制研究与设计[D].长沙:中南大学,2005
[93]李丽君,黄小原.委托代理理论方法在成本控制中的应用[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2002,23(10):937-939
[94]毋红军.基于多任务委托的工程监理委托-代理分析.华北水利水电学院学报[J],2007,28(3):101-103
[95]陆绍凯,何贤芬,姚雁飞.基于联合确定基数法的激励合同设计[J].深圳大学学报理工版,2008,25(1):55-60
[96]项勇,陶学明,王永强.不对称信息下建设项目委托代理激励机制理论分析[J].四川建筑科学研究,2009,4(35):276-278
[97] Liu Hai-tao, WEI Ru-xiang. Research on Target Cost Incentive Pricing based onPrincipal-agent Theory[A].2010Interactional Conference on Future InformationTechnology and Management Engineering[C]. Beijing: IEEE,2010:266-269
[98]同济大学经济管理学院参赛组.利益博弈与BIM推广的相互影响机制研究及仿真实验[R].北京:2012第五届“建设工程宇管理创新竞赛”,2012
[99] Weitzman M.L.. The “Ratchet Principle” and Performance Incentives[J]. Bell Journal ofEconomics,1980.11
[100] Meyer M., Vickers J.. Performance Comparison and Dynamic Incentive[M]. NuffieldCollege: Oxford University Press,1994:192-243
[101]房地产E网[DB/OL]. http://www.fdcew.com
[102]祝足,黄培清.信息不对称时对激励机制的选择[J].上海交通大学学报.1997(4):68-73
[103] Prajit K.Dutta. Strategies and Game: Theory and Practice [M].施锡铨译.上海市:上海财经大学出版社,2005:281-282.
[104]胡在铭.委托-代理理论框架中激励约束机制的制度安排[J].企业导报,2005,5:123-124
[105] Bengt Holmstrom. Design of Incentive Schemes and the New Soviet IncentiveModel[J]. European Economic Review,1982,17(2):127-148
[106] Kim S.K., Wang S.S.. Linear Contracts and the Double Moral Hazard[J]. Journal ofEconomic Theory(S0022-0531),1998,82:342-378.
[107] Mirrlees J.A.. The theory of moral hazard and unobservable belhaviour:part I[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66:3-21
[108] Ryan P.J., Henin C.G., Gandhi D.K.. Financial Incentives for Cost Control under MoralHazard[J]. International Journal of Management Science,1986,14(3):221-231
[109] Harris M., Raviv A.. Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1979,20:231-259
[110]胡祖光.联合确定基数合约:对魏茨曼模型的一个改进[J].经济研究,2007,3:81-91
[111]胡祖光.“联合确定墓数法”对策论模型—一个通俗的阐述[J].商业经济与管理,2001,4(114):8-12
[112]王凌峰, HU理论参数组合不确定问题的一个处理办法[J].内蒙古科技与经济,2006,206(4):78-79
[113]周登峰.“联合确定基数法”剖析[J].经济师,2006(8):197-198
[114]孟静,徐锋.联合确定基数法在指标制定中激励机制的阐释[J].中国商界,2008(5):143-147
[115]贾让成、胡小雁.随机环境下委托代理基数的确定[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2001(2):80-82
[116]丁元耀,贾让成.道德风险防范模型研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2001,12:67-70
[117]陆绍凯,何贤芬,姚雁飞.基于联合确定基数法的激励合同设计[J].深圳大学学报理工版,2008,25(1):55-60
[118]温波,金淑华.不确定性、风险偏好与利润基数[J].税务与经济,2006,4:69-72
[119] Jon Broome, John Perry. How practitioners set share fractions in target cost price [J].International Journal of Project Management,2002,20(1):59-66
[120] Akerlof G.. The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics.1970,84:488-500
[121] Spence A.M.. Job Market Signaling[J]. Quarterly Journal of conomics,2001,87(3):333-375.
[122]张新立.非对称信息条件下风险投资契约机理研究[D].大连市:大连理工大学,2008.4
[123] Spence A.M.. Job market signaling[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1973,87:335-374
[124] Spence A.M.. Market signaling[M]．Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,1974:21-88
[125] Berger J.O..统计决策论及贝叶斯分析[M].贾乃光译.北京:中国统计出版社,1998:277-312
[126]曾莹莹.最高限价招标与围标的博弈行为分析[J].基建优化,2007,28(5):95-98
[127]魏静.委托代理关系下的股票期权激励机制优化设计[D].武汉市:华中师范大学,2006.5
[128]翁东风,何洲汀.基于多维决策变量的工程项目最优激励契约设计[J].土木工程学报,2010,43(11):139-143
[129]秦旋.工程监理委托代理关系中激励约束与参与约束的研究[J].中国工程科学,2007,9(4):45-49
[130]邓曦,刘幸.政府投资工程代建制模式下的委托代理分析[J].武次理工大学学报,2007,9(4):148-151
[131]孙有发.倒数正态分布与证券收益异象原因研究[J].理论新探,2007,5(237):21-22
[132] Radner R.. Monitoring Cooperative Agreement in a Repeated Principal AgentRelationship[J]. Econometrica,1981,49:1127-1148
[133] Radner R.. Repeated Principal Agent Game with Discounting[J]. Econometria,985,53:1173-1198
[134] Mason C. F., Phillips O.R.. Vertical intergration and collusive incentive: anexperimental analysis[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000,18(3):471-496
[135] Beard T.R., Kaserman D.L., Mayo J.W.. Regulation, Vertical Integration andSabotage[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics,2001,49(3):319-333
[136]管百海,胡培.只具有施工能力工程总承包商的纵向一体化研究[J].土木工程学报,2010,43(6):134-138
[137]徐林.中国职业经理人市场的理论与实证研究[D].杭州市:浙江大学,2004.11
[138] Fama E.. Agence Promblems and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of PoliticalEconomy,1980,88:288-307
[139]王新斌.探索天富电力(集团)煤电热化工一体化多联产新型工业化产业发展之路[J].经济研究导刊,2010,8:40-42
[140]黄培,陈俊芳,林明勇.纵向一体化与非一体化生产方式的产业竞争博弈模型[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(2):69-73
[141] Bonanno G., Haworth B.. Internsity of competition and the choice between product andprocess innonvation[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1998,16(4):495-510
[142] Mason C.F., Phillips O.R.. Vertical integration and collusive incentiove an experimentalanalysis[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics,2002,50(1):23-42.
[143] Curiel I.. Co-operative game theory and applications co-operative games arising formcombinatorial optimization problems[M]. Boston, MA: Kluwer AcaadermicPublications,1997:183-236
[144]郭鹏,杨娅芳,曹朝喜.基于合作博弈论的纵向一体化战略决策模型研究[J].工业工程,2007,10(1):91-94
[145]邵华.建筑业新观念与建筑企业纵向一体化[J].现代管理科学,2007,11:73-74
[146] Sung, J.. Optimal contracts under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard:Acomtinuous-Time Approach[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2005,18:1021-1073
[147] Cvitanic J., Xuhu Wan, Jianfeng Zhang. Optimal contracts in Continuous-timeModels[J]. Journal of Applied Mathematics and Stochastic Analysis.2006,8:352-357
[148] Tadelis S.. The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism[J]. Journal ofPolictical Economy,2002,110(4):954-882
[149]张劲松.代理问题中的长期关系型契约—解决国有企业委托代理问题的新思考[J].新疆财经,2007,3:57-60
[150] Levene H.. Robust Tests for the Equality of Variance in Contributions to Probability andStatistics[M]. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press,1960:361-431
[151] Brown M.B., Forsythe A.B.. Robust Test for Equality of Variances[J]. Journal of theAmerican Statistical Association,1974,69:364-367
[152]程琮,范华. Lenvee方差齐性检验[J].中国卫生统计,2005,22(6):408-420
[153]庄楚强,何春雄.应用数理统计基础[M].第三版.广州:华南理工大学出版社,2006
[154]姜启源,谢金星,叶俊编.数学模型[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2003
[155]克雷普斯著.博弈论与经济模型.邓方译[M].北京:商务印书馆,2006
[156]同济大学数学教研室主编.高等数学(上下册)[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2000
[157]霍伊等著.经济数学[M].张维等译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006
