摘要
面对新产业链中分工和专业化的进一步深化,供应链协调机制有助于企业和他所处的供应网络获得竞争优势。供应链协调机制可以被看作用于管理供应网络全局优化和不确定性等协调问题的方法集。
本文基于文献回顾,主要做了以下研究:分析造成供应链协调问题的各种诱因,建立供应链协调机制基本框架;研究了满足Downside-Risk控制的激励下契约设计,使供应网络很好协调;然后从实际背景出发,运用博弈理论分析了在现存的产业环境中,除了企业间利用契约外,外力的介入(政府干预)对供应链协调的重要性。
本文主要内容及创新有以下几个部分:
1.文章提出供应链协调定义、特定子供应网络的有界性和协调本质问题的结构;基于交易成本分析,提出供应协调机制的控制与评估框架;指出能为企业和特定子供应网络来带持续的竞争优势将是供应链协调机制的运行效果体现。本文提出用资源结构共享性、决策体系、控制水平、激励机制和与SSCM能力契合度五个维度对该协调机制加以控制和评估。引入交易成本理论来度量每个维度上协调机制实施带来的成本增量。通过每个维度交易成本增量对特定子供应网络利益的边际贡献率来评估每个维度上的效率,确定改进的方向。
2.在供应链协调机制中,本文以风险倾向和利益分担为激励分析的切入点,对三层供应链模型中契约设计进行探讨。本文以由风险倾向分别为的厌恶和中性分销商和零售商组成三层供应链模型为对象,引入Downside-Risk控制。在新旧合作契约下分别建模求解可知风险中性方为风险规避方主动提供相应的风险保护,使其满足风险约束,这才使双方能够顺利合作共同分享增加的利润。结论是设计相应契约以施加风险保护的激励是供应链子链协调的基本前提,否则,即便有利益可以分享,也很难顺利实现协调。
3.从实际背景出发,运用博弈理论分析了外力介入对供应链协调的作用。本文以由众多生产商和寡头零售商组成的零供系统模型为研究对象,证明其独立定价并非最优,存在Pareto改进的空间。这种交易方式的存在首先并未实现社会福利的最大化;再者更不利于生产商自身的强大与发展,对民族工业的发展极为不利。要打破这种均衡,寻求Pareto改进,只能由政府出面管制和干预。
最后本文指出未来研究方向:对供应链协调机制框架量化和零供系统利益Pareto改进外力的度量和灵敏性研究。
With the division of labor and specialization further evolving in new industrial chain, supply chain mechanism is usually good for making the enterprise and his supply chain network gain necessary competitive advantage. Supply chain mechanism may be considered as a set of methods that could be used to make supply network global optimization and manage uncertainty.
This dissertation mostly analyzes all kinds of original causes that is essential for omnigenous problems in supply chain mechanism based on literature review. Then we approach the incentive contract designing under the condition that constraint of Downside-Risk control is satisfied, which could conduce the supply chain coordinated well. After that, considering the practice background of the realistic industrial environment, we make a study of the great importance of outside force intervening (e.g. government interfering) to supply network for supply chain mechanism. The main content and academic innovation within the dissertation follow as:
1. The dissertation addresses a definition of supply chain coordination, the attribute that a specific sub-supply-network indistinctly possesses its own boundary, and the structure of essential causes that induce the supply chain coordination problems within organizations as well as a framework for controlling and assessing some mechanism of supply chain coordination. Further more, the dissertation reaches a conclusion that helping to obtain sustained competitive advantage is the achievement of running appropriate supply chain coordination mechanism. Five dimensions composed of degree of sharing resource structure, decision-making style, control level, incentive modes and alignment between SCM (Supply Chain Management) ability and mechanism are used to control and assess the performance of coordination mechanism operation. And what is more, the dissertation takes advantage of TCT (Transaction Cost Theory) to measure the cost increment by executing every dimension aspect of coordination mechanism. And we can also compare rates of contribution margin by the relative cost increment to total profit increment in specific sub-supply-network to determine better improvement direction.
2. Within supply chain coordination mechanism, the dissertation pays attention to risk attitude considering and interest sharing, and mainly discusses the contract designing in a three-tier supply chain. An incentive contract between a risk-averse distributor and a downstream risk-neutral retailer in a three stages supply chain model is designed and modeled in order to study the mutual influence of risk-controlling and benefit-sharing on the cooperation of supply chain partners. As a result, the restriction of Downside-Risk is satisfied and revenue of each other is increased. We can draw a conclusion that the supply chain can be better coordinated and more profit can be produced when the supply chain cooperation contract is designed efficiently and the risk-neutral provide initiatively the risk-averse with necessary risk protecting to satisfy its restriction of risk.
3. Starting from the practical background, the dissertation utilizes game theory, mainly Stackelberg game and Rubinstein bargaining game, to analyze the impact on supply chain coordination by outside force intervening. Considering a model comprising many producers and few retail oligarchs as the research object, the dissertation proves that individual pricing is not optimal and improvement space exists. This transaction model firstly can not achieve to maximize social welfare, and even more is bad for manufacturers developing and becoming more powerful as well as national industry development. In order to change this bad equilibrium and seek Pareto improvement, the intervening and regulating by the government seems very important and necessary.
In the end, the future research direction is pointed out, which can be included as quantifying the framework of supply chain coordination mechanism and studying the measurement as well as sensitivity on the force by government for pursuing the goal of profits Pareto improvement.
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