摘要
近几年,我国上市公司高管薪酬增长速度大大超过GDP和企业业绩增长速度,甚至出现了天价年薪。而全球金融危机的爆发,使各国政府都关注到高管薪酬制度不合理,从美国、西欧,到东南亚,乃至我国政府都下了限薪令,随后又出现了“一元年薪”和“零年薪”。不论是天价年薪,还是“一元年薪”、“零年薪”,都暴露出我国现行高管业绩评价体系和薪酬激励机制存在着种种弊端,建立和完善高管薪酬制度已成为当务之急。而要建立合理的高管薪酬制度,必须以客观公正的高管业绩评价为基础。因此,研究探索如何剔除高管不可控因素对高管业绩评价的影响,使高管业绩评价结果,能够更真实地反映高管的管理能力和努力程度,并以此为基础构建科学的高管薪酬机制,具有十分重要的理论和现实意义。
本文引入相对业绩评价理论,将其与传统的绝对业绩评价进行比较,分析了将其应用于确定高管薪酬,能够有效剔除企业内外部客观环境对高管业绩的影响,有利于发挥高管薪酬机制的激励作用,并选择FJ公司为案例进行研究。在分析FJ公司时,首先评析目前FJ公司高管薪酬现状,分析其现行高管绩效考核与薪酬机制存在考核指标单一化、短期化倾向、考核指标值拟定不科学性、薪酬构成不尽合理等问题。之后,利用相对业绩评价基本理论和已有研究成果,借鉴我国现行较为先进的业绩指标体系,为FJ公司设计一套较合理的相对业绩评价指标;并从横向、纵向两个维度确定相对业绩评价系数,设置了一个较为完整的相对业绩评价体系,将相对业绩评价从理论层面向实际应用延伸拓展。最后,通过中外高管薪酬模式归纳比较,结合我国经济发展状况特殊性和FJ公司自身特点,重新构建以相对业绩评价体系为基础的高管薪酬机制,并提出完善治理结构、加强信息管理、辅以精神激励等实施保障措施,为相对业绩评价在我国其他行业企业的应用提供了有益借鉴。
In recent years in China, compared with GDP and company performance, the growth rate of CEO’s salary has greatly exceeded them, even the sky-high annual salary has come out. However, with the outbreak of the global financial crisis, governments noticed that executive salary system is unreasonable. No matter in the United States, Western Europe, or Southeast Asia, even our government has set the guidelines in salary limits, then "one-dollar annual salary" and "zero annual salary " came out. No matter“sky-high annual salary”, "one-dollar annual salary" or "zero annual salary ", all revealed current drawbacks of executive performance evaluation system and salary incentives system in China. To establish and perfect the executive salary system has become a top task. The establishment of reasonable executive salary system should be based on objective and fair performance evaluation. Therefore, it’s of great theoretical and practical significance to achieve the followings: to research how to exclude uncontrollable factors on executives performance evaluation; to more truly reflect the executive's management level and effort by executive performance evaluation results, to set a scientific executive salary system on the above basis.
By introducing the relative performance evaluation theory and comparing it with traditional absolute performance evaluation, this article analyses its application in determining executive salary, which helps to exclude effect from objective environment against executive performance and is good for playing the incentive role. It chooses FJCompany for the research. Firstly, it makes an assessment of current CEO salary status in FJCompany; secondly, on the basis of basic theory of relative performance evaluation and existing research results, as well as current advanced performance indicator system, it designs a complete set of reasonable relative performance evaluation system; finally, by comparison of Chinese and foreign executive salary models, combination of special characteristics of our economic development and FJ Company, re-set executive salary mechanism on basis of relative performance evaluation system, bring forward measures such as perfect governance structure, strengthen information management, accompanied by spiritual incentive; it could be used as reference in other fields.
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