摘要
在社会生活的各个层面,意见分歧都无时无处不在。通常人们期望通过意见各方的交流来缓和及化解分歧,然而有时却得非所愿,甚至反而酿成更激烈的冲突。围绕着交流对意见分歧的影响这一主题,社会心理学中以往在合作决策、竞-合决策、态度改变等领域,从不同角度进行了众多富有意义的研究。
以往的相关研究中,群体决策的意见整合研究与建议采纳研究采用不同的合作决策任务范式下,但都侧重于考察信息交流对合作决策中意见整合的影响,关注达成一致意见的选择过程,而关于不同意见聚合的共识过程的考察相对薄弱；“最后通牒”任务下的竞-合决策研究,对竞-合决策中的行为互动、行为偏好以及相关影响因素进行了丰富的探讨,但对行动信息交流与竞-合决策中意见分歧的关系,较少针对性的研究；态度改变的说服理论也探讨了信息传递对态度改变的影响,但对意见分歧双方的互动与态度改变的动态过程仍需进一步考察。此外,近年国内学者针对中国人处理人际事务尤其是纷争的态度进行了研究,但研究方法主要限于语义分析和问卷调查法。
在对既往相关研究的文献分析的基础上,构建本研究的研究路径。针对以往的相关研究在研究视角、研究内容以及研究的生态效度方面所存在的不足,本研究主要采用实验法,利用生态效度较高的任务范式,着重探讨信息交流过程对社会决策中意见分歧的影响。
实验研究部分由两个部分五个实验组成,其中实验一、实验二、实验三探讨了言语信息交流对合作决策中意见分歧的影响,实验四和实验五探讨了行动信息交流过程对竞-合决策中意见分歧的影响。具体如下：
研究一主要探讨言语信息交流对合作决策中意见分歧的影响。
实验一采用模拟的合作决策任务,探讨信息对称性(即合作决策双方所获信息的一致程度)对合作决策双方意见分歧程度的影响,并筛选适宜于后续研究的任务条件。研究发现,信息对称性对合作决策者的意见分歧程度具有显著影响,相较于信息一致和无偏向不一致条件,在双方所获信息为有偏向不一致的条件下,意见分歧程度最大。
实验二采用经实验一确定的合作决策任务,通过计算机联网实现合作决策双方的在线交流,考察了合作决策双方的交流过程对决策意见分歧的影响,同时检验信息对称性对交流过程的影响。研究发现, (1)实验二的合作决策任务中存在显著的言语信息交流效应,交流过程有助于减少意见分歧的程度,但并不能决定最终决策结果的方向；(2)信息对称性对合作决策者初始决策意见分歧具有显著影响,同时,信息对称性对被试的交流过程有显著影响,合作决策双方所获信息的不对称程度越强,信息交流的效应最明显；(3)通过对交流过程的内容分析发现,最终决策意见状态不同的个体,在交流过程中的发言总句数、陈述己方理由、反驳对方理由、变化重申决策意见、简单重复决策意见、给予否定反馈、给予肯定反馈、主动询问对方意见、寻求其他可能等类目上存在显著差异,反映出理由角度与反馈的影响相对更显著。实验二为探讨社会互动中的态度改变,提供了新的视角并在研究方法上进行了新的尝试。
实验三在实验一和实验二的基础上,通过独立决策-交流-再独立决策的三阶段任务范式和计算机联网模拟多轮商讨的方式,进一步检验理由角度与反馈两个自变量对言语信息交流效应的影响。对交流效果的分析从三方面指标进行：过程指标(交流指数)、结果指标(最终决策意见、决策意见的变化程度)和态度指标(对交流结果的满意度、交流过程的愉快度、交流对象的态度、交流对象的沟通能力、交流对象的固执程度的主观评价)。研究发现, (1)理由角度与反馈两个因素对交流效果具有显著影响,在过程指标上,理由角度的主效应显著；在结果指标上,理由角度与反馈都具有显著影响且两因素具有交互作用；在态度指标上,理由角度对被试对交流结果和他人沟通能力的评价显著影响,反馈对被试的情绪体验有显著影响；(2)信息交流后对他人意见的“同意”存在异质现象：真同意,是表里如一的基于态度改变的“同意”；假同意,是表里不一的、策略性的“同意”。
研究二探讨行动信息交流过程对竞-合决策中意见分歧双方决策行为的影响。
实验四采用重复的“最后通牒”竞-合决策任务,探讨在持续的行动信息交流过程中,他人行动信息的变化对个体决策行为的影响。结果表明竞-合决策中存在显著的行动信息交流效应,行动信息交流影响了个体对他人印象的调控,进而影响个体决策的思考过程,但具体的决策行为仍然由具体的决策问题(如“最后通牒”任务中的提议方案)所决定。实验四还说明,竞-合决策中意见分歧的核心源问题在于“自利”与“公平”之间的权衡。
实验五采用“最后通牒”竞-合决策任务,考察藏族和汉族大学生被试在与同文化和异文化个体进行“最后通牒”竞-合决策的行为,结果表明了藏族和汉族大学生被试在亚文化内和亚文化间进行社会交往行为上并不存在文化差异。同时实验五也表明“自利”与“公平”的权衡在不同文化间的普遍性,是导致竞-合决策行为中决策者意见分歧的核心问题,对实验四的发现从文化因素的角度进行了补充。
通过一系列实验,本研究得到如下主要结论：(1)社会决策中意见分歧的信息交流效应,主要表现为信息交流过程影响意见分歧变化的程度,但不能决定性地预测意见分歧变化的方向。(2)合作决策中理由角度和反馈共同影响言语信息交流效应,且在交流效果的不同指标上体现出不同的影响。(3)竞-合决策中行动信息交流影响了决策者的思考过程,但不能改变决策行为。竞-合决策中意见分歧的核心源问题在于“自利”和“公平”的权衡。(4)社会决策中,意见分歧双方在交流过程中存在着对他人意见“同意”的异质现象,即信息交流后对他人的意见“同意”出现两种分化,一种是基于态度改变的“真同意”,一种是策略性的“假同意”
The opinion divergence is everpresent. Communication is usuallly regarded as the right approach to resolve opinion divergence. However the truth is just the reverse. Previous researches about group decision-making and advice taking have mainly investigated how people take other's opinion in the selection process, without considering the consensus process. Attiditudes change theory has also disscussed the impact of information transfer on attitudes change. In addition, some scholars have investegated how Chinese people undersdand and deal with opion divergence, but the method adopted in those studies was limited in semantics analysis and qustionare investigation. Although there were many descriptions and researches about the relationship of communication or information exchange and attitude change or conflict resolution, there was no experimental research about the impact of communication process on opinion divergence in social decision making situation.
The communication process can divided into verbal communication and behavioral communication, according to the information transferred through communication. Verbal communication is the interpersonal communication through words; behavioral communication is a psychological construct that addresses people's use of behaviors as a form of communication.
Based on the above analysis, two parts of studies were conducted, to explore the effect of verbal and behavioral communication on the change of opinion divergence in social decision-making. As follows:
Part I of the study aimed to explore the effect of verbal communication on the change of opinion divergence in cooperative decision-making.
In experiment 1, a cooperative decision making task was adopted to explore the influence of information type on extent of the divergence on opinion. The results showed that the extent of opinion divergence differed significantly in three types of information condition.
In experiment 2, the cooperation decision task which determined through experiment1 was adopted, to investigate whether the verbal communication through computer network have impact on the difference of opinion between decision makers. The result indicated that,(1) there was significanct communication effect on the opinion divergence in cooperation decision making, this verbal communication was helpful in reduction the extent of divergence, but cannot determine the direction of opinion change; (2) information symmetry had significant influence on the opinion divergence, by influencing the communication process; (3) there were many factors in communication process, such as the amount of sentence, the reason, the simple repetition of decision opinion, the negative feedback, the affirmation feedback and so on. Among those factors, reason and feedback are the two most prominent factors.
In experiment3, one three-stage cooperation decision task was adopted, to explore the reason and the feedback, as two independent variables, how to influence the communication effect. The index of communication included processual index, consequential index, and attitudinal indexes. The results revealed that, (1) there were significant influences of reason and feedback on the indexes of communication effect. In more specific terms, the reason have main effect on the processual index, the reason and the feedback factors both have main effects on the consequential indexes; (2) there was a heterogeneous agreement with other opinion, that is, the "agreement" with others' decision consists of two types, one is Really agreement which based on attitude change, and the other is Simulated agreement which is a kind of strategically response. The phenomenon of heterogeneous agreement implied the difference of the tendency of pursuing harmony and the tendency of pursuing sameness and identical. Harmony does not mean to follow and echo others' views. It is reached by seeking common ground while preserving differences, but not by agreement clinched without giving serious thought.
Part II of the study aimed to explore the effect of behavioral communication on the change of opinion divergence in coopetition decision-making.
In experiment 4, a modified version of the ultimatum game was adopted, in which three types of proposer (selfish, fair-minded, and generous) and three types of offers (low, even, high) were set. The purpose of experiment 4 was to test if the behavioral information of proposer can change responders'decisions. The results showed that responders'decision process were different due to behavioral information of proposer, and indicated an impression shifting process based on the observed behavioral information, that is, impression accumulation, impression formation, impression interference, and then new impression formation. The results also showed that, responders'decision results were influenced mainly by the type of offers. Subjects tend to accept high offer rapidly, but reject the other unfair offer (low offer) more slowly. In addition, the acceptance of high-offer was more hesitantly in contrast to even offer. The results implied that the core issue of opinion divergence in coopetition decision making situation is the balance between self-interest and fairness.
The purpose of experiment 5 was to compare the decision-making of Tibetan nationality and Han nationality university students in ultimatum game, which carried on with someone from the same culture or the different culture. The results indicated that there was no significant cultural difference in the decision behaviors between intercultural and intracultural coopetition decision-making situation
From the experiments above, the following conclusions are put forward:the communication effect on opinion divergence in social decision-making, manifested mainly in its influence on the extent of changing of option divergence, not on the direction of opinion change direction; the factors of communication effect in cooperative decision making mainly consist of reason and feedback in communication process; behavioral communication have influence on the decision process, but cannot change the decision outcome, the core issue of opinion divergence in coopetition decision making situation is the balance between self-interest and fairness; there is a obvious tendency of pursuing sameness and identical in communication under social decision making situation.
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