摘要
自20世纪中期以来,通过企业管理层持股等新的激励方式解决委托代理问题开始从理论探讨成为现实并在以美国为代表的西方发达国家得到广泛应用。这些激励方式较好地解决了委托代理问题,促进了企业的成长,推动了经济的发展,但与此同时,许多问题也暴露出来并造成了巨大的危害。在股权分置改革全面完成后的中国,上市公司的管理层股权激励呈现出上升趋势。随着有关政策的陆续出台和上市公司激励方案实施经验的日渐丰富,采用股权激励政策的上市公司有望呈现加速增长的局面。本文旨在通过深入研究管理层持股与公司绩效的关系,为股权激励在我国的正常实施和良性发展提供重要的参考依据。
本文首先对管理层持股和股权激励关系的国内外文献进行了概述,并指出研究结果高度不一致的三个主要原因,然后对委托代理理论、人力资本理论和X效率理论三大理论基础进行了回顾。在介绍了管理层持股对公司绩效影响的几种假说后,对“利益趋同”假说和“管理者防御”假说进行了理论分析,结果表明,管理层持股与公司绩效之间存在着非线性关系,其变化趋势与具体的函数形式和参数设置有关。在此基础上,本文尝试将管理层持股对公司绩效的影响视为持股对管理者具体行为倾向的影响,并结合我国国情,将“利益趋同”效应和“管理者防御”效应进行了细化。在对接管市场压力、额外的在职消费、欺骗行为的诱惑和努力工作的收益四类主要的影响因素逐一进行分析后,本文认为管理层持股对公司绩效的影响类似于一个三次方非线性关系,从而接受三次方关系的假设。
随后本文利用沪深两市414家上市公司1999年-2005年的数据,对管理层持股水平与经营绩效之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,管理层持股对公司绩效影响的两种力量同时存在且其相互作用的规律与国外上市公司类似,二者存在显著的“N型”三次方关系。当前我国管理层持股与公司绩效仍处于同向变动阶段,因此上市公司应该通过积极增加管理者持股水平来提升公司绩效。鉴于国有企业的特殊重要性及其在公司治理方面与非国有企业存在的明显区别,本文将样本公司分为国有和非国有两类公司分别研究。回归结果发现两类公司都满足三次方关系,但国有上市公司的最优持股水平明显低于非国有上市公司,其通过管理层持股提升上市公司绩效的空间相对有限。国有企业的公司治理问题更加严重,仍需进行全面、深入的改革。
Starting from the middle of 20th century, new incentive approaches by according managers appropriate stock ownership to deal with the agency problem had been taken practice out of theoretic suggestions and had been widely taken throughout the western countries represented by USA. These approaches solved the agency problem and promoted the development of the companies and the economy. But there also came relevant problems and wrecked the economic system. After the split-share reform in China, the stock ownership incentives of listed companies are on the rise. With the presence of more policies and more experienced incentive projects in this region, it is expected that the increase on number of listed companies adopting managerial stock ownership will accelerate. This paper tries to look into the relationship between the management stock ownership and corporate performance, and to provide valuable advices on the operating and developing of ownership incentives in China.
The thesis fist reviewed the relevant researches at home and abroad and pointed out the three main problems of the huge gaps among these researches. Then it reviewed the three basic theories including Principle-agent Theory, Human Capital Theory and X-efficiency Theory. After introducing the main hypotheses of the effects of managerial stock ownership on the corporation performance, we focused on the Convergence- of-interests Hypothesis and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis and conducted theoretical analyses. The results presented a non-linear relation between the managerial ownership and corporate performance and the trend depends on the specific function forms and the parameter sets. The thesis then took the influence of managerial ownership on the corporate performance as the result of the influences on the specific managerial behaviors, and tried to divide the Convergence-of-interests Hypothesis and the Entrenchment Hypothesis into elements, considering our country's conditions. The results suggested that the relationship appeared to be similar with a triple non-linear relation, after analyzing the four main elements of the effect, which are Influence of Takeover Market Pressure, Influence of Excessive In-office Expense, Influence of Deceiving Tendency and Influence of Working-hard Tendency. Thus we adopted the triple non-linear hypothesis on the relationship of stock ownership and performance.
The thesis then conducted an empirical study on the subject. The data was from 414 listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Markets during 1999 and 2005. Results confirmed the similarity of Chinese companies and the foreign companies on the relationship of managerial ownership and performance, which presented an N shaped triple relation. In Chinese companies now, managerial ownership and performance are moving in the same direction, so companies should increase the managerial ownership to promote the corporation performance. Considering the importance of the State-owned enterprises (SOEs, State-controlled enterprises precisely), we categorized the samples into SOEs and NSOEs (Non-state-owned enterprises). Regression results confirmed that the two categories of samples still satisfied the triple relation, while SOEs are having a lower optimal managerial ownership level, thus they are relatively restricted comparing NSOEs to promote their performance by increasing the managerial ownership. SOEs are facing a more serious corporate governance problem and they are still in need of wider and deeper reforms.
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