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内部出版物
CNKI学位论文(109)
知网期刊论文(61)
在“
Elsevier电子期刊
”中,
命中:
390
条,耗时:0.011027 秒
在所有数据库中总计命中:
170
条
1.
The role of social networks in cultural assimilation
作者:
Thierry Verdier
a
;
thierry.verdier@ens.fr
;
Yves Zenou
;
b
;
yves.zenou@monash.edu
关键词:
Assimilation
;
Majority individuals
;
Ethnic minorities
;
Network centrality
;
Network formation
刊名:Journal of Urban Economics
出版年:2017
2.
Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
作者:
I. Arribas
a
;
b
;
c
;
ivan.arribas@uv.es
;
A. Urbano
a
;
c
;
amparo.urbano@uv.es
关键词:
C72
;
D21
;
D41
;
D43
;
L13
刊名:Journal of Economic Theory
出版年:2017
3.
Behavior-based price discrimination and customer information sharing
作者:
Romain De Nijs
romain.de-nijs@polytechnique.edu
关键词:
Price discrimination
;
Dynamic pricing
;
Privacy
;
Information sharing
刊名:International Journal of Industrial Organization
出版年:2017
4.
On the Shortest Path Game
作者:
Andreas Darmann
a
;
andreas.darmann@uni-graz.at
;
Ulrich Pferschy
b
;
pferschy@uni-graz.at
;
Joachim Schauer
b
;
joachim.schauer@uni-graz.at
关键词:
Shortest path problem
;
Game theory
;
Computational complexity
;
Cactus graph
刊名:Discrete Applied Mathematics
出版年:2017
5.
Subgame
perfect
equilibria in discounted stochastic games
作者:
Mitri Kitti
mitri.kitti@gmail.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
关键词:
Stochastic game
;
Subgame
perfect
equilibrium
;
Payoff correspondence
;
Fixed-point equation
;
Induced equilibrium policy
刊名:Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
出版年:2016
6.
Equilibrium existence for large
perfect
information games
作者:
Carlos Aló
;
s-Ferrer
a
;
carlos.alos-ferrer@uni-koeln.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
;
Klaus Ritzberger
b
;
1
;
ritzbe@ihs.ac.at" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
关键词:
Backwards induction
;
Subgame
perfect
ion
;
Equilibrium existence
;
Large extensive form games
;
Perfect
information
刊名:Journal of Mathematical Economics
出版年:2016
7.
Subgame
perfect
implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
作者:
Pablo Amoró
;
s
;
pag@uma.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
刊名:Mathematical Social Sciences
出版年:2016
8.
Strategic sharing of a costly network
作者:
Pené
;
lope Herná
;
ndez
a
;
penelope.hernandez@uv.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
;
Josep E. Peris
b
;
peris@ua.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
;
José
;
A. Silva-Reus
b
;
jose.silva@ua.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
关键词:
Minimum cost spanning tree
;
Cost allocation
;
Transfer structure
;
Subgame
perfect
equilibrium
;
Core
刊名:Journal of Mathematical Economics
出版年:2016
9.
Game theory-based model for maximizing SSP utility in cognitive radio networks
作者:
Lu Wang
;
luwang.buaa@gmail.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
;
Zhong Zhou
;
Wei Wu
关键词:
Cognitive radio
;
spectrum pricing strategy
;
Game theory
;
subgame
perfect
nash equilibrium
;
Markov chain
刊名:Computer Communications
出版年:2016
10.
Application of Crowdfunding on the Financing of EV's Charging Piles
作者:
Zhu Lijing
a
;
Lu Huihui
a
;
Zhang Qi
a
;
zhangqi@cup.edu.cn
;
Li Hailong
b
;
Pan Xunzhang
a
;
Wang Ge
a
;
Li Yan
a
关键词:
Electric vehicles (EV)
;
Charging piles
;
Crowdfunding financing
;
Sequential game
;
subgame
perfect
equilibrium
刊名:Energy Procedia
出版年:2016
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